VERDICT
11 LB 665/18
10 A 1242/17
In the administrative law case
of Mr. xxx,
– Plaintiff and appellant –
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam,
Lange Geismarstraße 55, 37073 Göttingen,
against
Hanover Police Directorate,
Waterloostraße 9, 30169 Hanover,
– Defendant and Respondent –
due to the finding that a police surveillance was unlawful
The Higher Administrative Court of Lower Saxony – 11th Senate – without oral proceedings, on February 28, 2019, through the Vice President of the Higher Administrative Court xxx, the Judge of the Higher Administrative Court xxx, the Judge of the Higher Administrative Court xxx, as well as the Lay Judge xxx and the Lay Judge xxx, rendered the following judgment:
Upon the plaintiff's appeal, the judgment of the Administrative Court of Hanover – 10th Chamber – of December 12, 2017 is set aside.
The case is referred back to the Administrative Court of Hanover.
The decision on costs remains reserved for the decision of the administrative court.
The appeal is not admitted.
FACTS
The plaintiff seeks a declaration that a police surveillance operation was unlawful.
The plaintiff is an active supporter of the "Independent Youth Center Kornstraße" (hereinafter: UJZ Korn), where he previously worked as managing director and office manager. According to the defendant, it had received information indicating that meetings of supporters of the so-called Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) – an organization banned in the Federal Republic of Germany and classified as a terrorist organization – were planned at UJZ Korn. Subsequently, officers from the defendant's State Security Service conducted covert surveillance from a building opposite the center for approximately six hours each time on July 27, 2014, March 8, 2015, and July 26, 2015. Some of the photographs taken during the surveillance on July 26, 2015, show the plaintiff in contact with individuals whom the defendant suspected of supporting the PKK.
Subsequently, the Lüneburg public prosecutor's office initiated criminal investigations against the plaintiff and the three board members of the sponsoring association of the UJZ Korn – the "Association for the Promotion of Political Youth Cultures" – on suspicion of violating Section 20 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 No. 4 of the Associations Act. As part of these investigations, the Lüneburg District Court, by order dated February 4, 2016, authorized the search of the UJZ Korn, which took place on February 15, 2016.
On February 6, 2017, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit with the Administrative Court. In support of his claim, he argued essentially that the surveillance had led to the initiation of criminal proceedings against him. He also asserted that there was no relevant legal basis for the surveillance. Furthermore, he objected to the defendant's failure to document the alleged findings that had led to the surveillance order. Consequently, the defendant's conduct was incomprehensible and therefore unlawful.
The plaintiff has requested that
to determine that the surveillance of the building of the Independent Youth Center at Kornstraße 28, 30167 Hannover, on July 26, 2015 was unlawful.
The defendant has requested that
to dismiss the lawsuit.
In the oral hearing held before the Administrative Court on June 14, 2017, the plaintiff submitted motions for the taking of evidence. The Chamber subsequently decided that, in response to the plaintiff's motion for the taking of evidence, "evidence regarding the circumstances giving rise to the defendant's surveillance of the Kornstraße youth center should be gathered in accordance with the provisions of public safety law." By order dated October 6, 2017, the Chamber scheduled a further oral hearing for December 12, 2017, and summoned two police officers involved in the surveillance as witnesses. In a written submission dated November 15, 2017, the plaintiff informed the Chamber, in response to a corresponding inquiry, that the criminal investigation initiated against him had been discontinued by order of the Public Prosecutor's Office pursuant to Section 170 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the oral hearing held before the Administrative Court on December 12, 2017, the defendant's representative submitted to the Chamber the discontinuation order issued by the Lüneburg Public Prosecutor's Office on October 2, 2017. The Chamber then adjourned the session for deliberation. Subsequently, the Chamber rescinded the order for the taking of evidence dated June 14, 2017, and rejected the plaintiff's motions for the taking of evidence dated June 14, 2017. According to the minutes of the oral hearing, the presiding judge informed the parties that the main reasons for rejecting the motions for the taking of evidence were that the evidence was obtained through discovery and that the inadmissibility of the action precluded its taking.
In the contested judgment, the Administrative Court dismissed the action. It reasoned that the action was inadmissible. While a legal relationship capable of being established by declaratory judgment existed, the plaintiff lacked the qualified legal interest required for the action to be admissible. Such an interest did not arise from a risk of recurrence, because it had neither been demonstrated nor was it apparent that a comparable surveillance operation would soon occur again. There was no interest in rehabilitation, because the surveillance had been conducted covertly and therefore did not inherently carry any outwardly apparent ethical or moral condemnation. Nor did an interest in a declaratory judgment arise from the initiation of criminal proceedings, as these had since been discontinued and a resumption was not to be expected. The assumption of an interest in a declaratory judgment due to a serious infringement of fundamental rights was precluded, because the infringement of the plaintiff's rights was merely marginal and not serious, since neither he himself nor his actions were recognizably the cause or target of the surveillance.
The plaintiff appealed this judgment, and the Senate granted leave to appeal by decision of December 17, 2018 – 11 LA 66/18 – due to serious doubts as to the correctness of the first-instance decision. In its reasoning, the Senate essentially stated that, contrary to the opinion of the Administrative Court, a qualified legal interest existed.
In support of his appeal, the plaintiff refers to his submissions in the admission proceedings.
The plaintiff requests that
to overturn the judgment of the Administrative Court of Hanover of December 12, 2017, and to declare that the surveillance of the building of the Independent Youth Center at Kornstraße 28, 30167 Hanover, on July 26, 2015, was unlawful, and to refer the case back to the Administrative Court of Hanover for further proceedings and decision.
The defendant essentially requests that
to reject the appeal.
There is no legal relationship capable of being established, or at least no legitimate interest in obtaining a declaratory judgment as required for the desired finding of illegality. If the plaintiff wished to clarify the legality of the data collection with regard to the criminal investigation, he should have sought this clarification within the investigation itself.
The parties involved declared their agreement to a decision without oral proceedings in written submissions dated January 9 and 10, 2019.
For further details of the submissions of the parties and the facts of the case, reference is made to the court file and the supplementary files.
REASONS FOR DECISION
The court decides on the appeal in accordance with Section 125 Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Section 101 Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGO) with the consent of the parties involved, without holding an oral hearing.
Upon the plaintiff's corresponding request, the case is to be referred back to the Administrative Court pursuant to Section 130 Paragraph 2 No. 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure.
Pursuant to Section 130 Paragraph 2 No. 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO), the Higher Administrative Court may, insofar as further proceedings are necessary, remand the case to the Administrative Court, setting aside the judgment and the proceedings, if the Administrative Court has not yet ruled on the merits and a party requests such remand. In the present case, the Administrative Court – as explained in more detail in the order granting leave to appeal dated December 17, 2018 – wrongly denied the existence of the qualified legal interest required for the admissibility of a declaratory action relating to a past legal relationship. It therefore dismissed the action as a procedural judgment and did not rule on the merits. This constitutes a case under Section 130 Paragraph 2 No. 2 Sentence 1 of the German Code of Administrative Procedure (VwGO) (see Blanke, in: Sodan/Ziekow, VwGO, 5th ed. 2018, Section 130, marginal note 11; Rudisile, in: Schoch/Schneider/Bier, VwGO, as of May 2018, Section 130, marginal note 8; Happ, in: Eyermann, VwGO, 15th ed. 2019, Section 130, marginal note 12, each with further references). The other prerequisites for a remand – a corresponding application by a party to the proceedings and the lack of readiness for a decision in the case – are also met in this case. The lack of a decision is due to the fact that the Administrative Court, in the oral hearing of June 14, 2017, ordered the taking of evidence to further clarify the circumstances giving rise to the surveillance in question – i.e., substantive legal criteria. However, this taking of evidence has not yet taken place because the Chamber erred in law by assuming that, following the discontinuation of the investigation pursuant to Section 170 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by order of the Public Prosecutor's Office on October 2, 2017, no qualified legal interest in protection existed. The requirement of effective legal protection demands, in the case of measures that typically resolve themselves quickly – as here – that the affected party can have the measure affecting them reviewed in a main judicial proceeding, regardless of the severity of the associated infringement of their rights (see in detail: Senate Decision of December 17, 2018 – 11 LA 66/18 –). If, therefore, the plaintiff has a qualified legal interest in establishing the illegality of the surveillance carried out on July 26, 2015, it is necessary for the Administrative Court to further clarify whether the substantive legal requirements for the surveillance in question were met.
The possibility of remanding the case, which is thus opened up, is at the discretion of the appellate court pursuant to Section 130 Paragraph 2 No. 2 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGO). In exercising this discretion, particular consideration must be given to aspects of procedural economy, shortening the legal process, the expediency of a review in two instances, and the acceleration of the proceedings (see Federal Administrative Court, Decision of 4 September 2014 – 4 B 30/14 –, juris, para. 16; Higher Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg, Decision of 2 June 2017 – NC 9 S 1244/17 –, juris para. 6; Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria, Decision of 16 March 2011 – 12 B 10/2407 –, juris, para. 27; Eyermann, loc. cit., § 130, para. 15; Roth, in: Posser/Wolff, BeckOK VwGO, as of 1 January 2019, § 130, para. 9). Based on this, the court exercises its discretion by remanding the case to the Administrative Court for a new decision. As explained above, the Administrative Court has not yet reviewed the substantive legal requirements for the surveillance in question, meaning that a final ruling by the appellate court would deprive the plaintiff of a factual review process. Furthermore, as explained above, reviewing the substantive legal requirements for the surveillance in question necessitates further clarification of the facts, which the Administrative Court initiated by ordering the taking of evidence but has not yet completed. In light of this, and considering the division of responsibilities between the appellate and lower courts, the appellate court deems remanding the case appropriate. This also avoids shortening the legal process (see Baden-Württemberg Higher Administrative Court, Decision of June 2, 2017 – NC 9 S 1244/17 –, juris, para. 7; the same court, Judgment of February 7, 2014 – 9 S 2518/13 –, juris, para. 30). In contrast, the aspect of procedural acceleration exceptionally recedes into the background here, especially since it is not prioritized by the parties involved (see Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, Decision of March 16, 2011 – 12 B 10/2407 –, juris, para. 28).
With the case being remanded, the first instance proceedings are reopened with the finality of this decision. The proceedings continue there with the binding effect prescribed in Section 130 Paragraph 3 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGO).
The decision regarding costs is reserved to the administrative court (Lower Saxony Higher Administrative Court, decision of 23 November 2017 – 13 LB 239/17 –, publication not published; Baden-Württemberg Higher Administrative Court, decision of 2 June 2017 – NC 9 S 1244/17 –, juris, para. 8; Happ, in: Eyermann, loc. cit., § 130, para. 19).
There are no grounds for granting leave to appeal pursuant to Section 132 Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act.
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