State Social Court of Lower Saxony-Bremen – Decision of July 9, 2019 – Case No.: L 8 AY 7/19 ER

DECISION

L 8 AY 7/19 B ER
S 42 AY 10/19 ER Social Court Hildesheim

In the appeal proceedings

xxx,

– Applicant and complainant –

Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam,
Lange Geismarstraße 55, 37073 Göttingen

against

City of Göttingen, Legal Department,
Hiroshimaplatz 1 – 4, 37083 Göttingen

– Respondent and Appellant –

The 8th Senate of the Lower Saxony-Bremen State Social Court decided on July 9, 2019 in Celle through Judges xxx and xxx and Judge xxx:

Upon the applicant's appeal, the decision of the Hildesheim Social Court of 12 February 2019 is overturned insofar as it rejected the application for an interim injunction.

The respondent is ordered by way of preliminary injunction to grant the applicant provisional benefits pursuant to Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in conjunction with Book XII of the German Social Code (SGB XII) from February 1, 2019, until a final and binding decision is reached in the legal proceedings pending before the Hildesheim Social Court – S 42 AY 19/19 –, – S 42 AY 32/19 –, – S 42 AY 63/19 – and – S 42 AY 82/19 – or concerning the granting of benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) to the applicant for the period from June to December 2019, but no later than December 31, 2019, taking into account any benefits already granted for this period. The application for preliminary relief is otherwise dismissed.

The respondent must reimburse the applicant's extrajudicial costs for the first and second instance proceedings.

The application for legal aid is rejected.

REASONS
I.

The dispute concerns the amount of benefits to be granted provisionally under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the period from the end of January 2019, in particular the legality of a restriction of entitlement pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 AsylbLG.

The applicant, who claims to have been born on [date redacted], asserts that he is a Lebanese national, entered Germany illegally without identity documents, and applied for asylum in Oldenburg in early November 2015. After a stay in Friedland, he was assigned to the respondent; an application for transfer to Oldenburg to live with a brother there was unsuccessful in November 2016. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) rejected his asylum application by a (legally binding) decision dated April 22, 2017. Since then, the applicant has been subject to a temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung) due to lack of a passport, which has been extended several times.

In response to the (initial) request from the respondent's immigration office dated July 24, 2017, to obtain a passport from his country of origin, the applicant submitted an information sheet from the Lebanese Embassy in Berlin to his immigration file. This sheet documented his appearance on August 10, 2017, and listed, among other things, the requirement of a valid residence permit for Germany as a prerequisite for issuing a national passport (see point 7 of the information sheet). Subsequently, the applicant was repeatedly requested (on August 17, November 10, and December 19, 2017) to submit a passport from his country of origin (or an extract from the Lebanese register) to the immigration office. From August to December 2018, at his almost weekly appointments for the issuance of temporary residence permits, the applicant stated that he was not submitting the requested documents, would not sign a substitute passport application, and possessed no documents that would credibly prove his identity.

After receiving basic benefits under Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) and so-called analogous benefits under Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG, most recently granted by payment of €377.60 for the month of September 2017 (including deduction for household energy: €31.40), and after hearing the applicant regarding a restriction of entitlement, the respondent granted him, from October 1, 2017, in addition to the provision of accommodation and heating as benefits in kind, only restricted (cash) benefits in the monthly amount of €180.49 pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the AsylbLG.

On September 25, 2018, the applicant filed an objection against the granting of benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) "for the current period" and limited the scope of the proceedings to the period from November 2017 to October 2018 (letter from the applicant's legal representative dated October 17, 2018, p. 261 of the administrative file). With a further objection dated January 25, 2019, he also challenged the granting of benefits from November 2018 onwards.

Also on January 25, 2019, the applicant filed an application for preliminary legal protection with the Hildesheim Social Court (SG), seeking provisional benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in accordance with the court's legal opinion, and alternatively, an order suspending the effect of his objection of September 25, 2018, against the respondent's decision of September 28, 2017. The SG rejected the application for preliminary relief by order of February 12, 2019, on the grounds that the applicant had violated his obligations under Section 48 Paragraph 3 of the Residence Act (AufenthG) regarding identification, and that this was the reason for the non-enforcement of the measures to terminate his residence. A time limit on the restriction of benefits was deemed unnecessary in this specific case due to the implied granting of benefits.

The applicant filed an appeal against this decision on February 14, 2019. During the preliminary injunction proceedings, the respondent rejected the objection of September 25, 2018, against the granting of benefits for the period from November 2017 to October 2018, and the objection of January 25, 2019, against the granting of benefits from November 2018 onwards, by separate notices of rejection dated February 13, 2019. The applicant filed timely actions against these two decisions with the Social Court (case numbers - S 42 AY 20/19 -, - S 42 AY 19/19 -) and limited the subject matter of the second action to the period from November 2018 to February 2019 (see statement of claim dated February 26, 2019). From March 2019, the applicant continued to receive restricted benefits pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), specifically €179.73 for March 2019 by decision of February 15, 2019, as amended by the appeal decision of February 20, 2019 (action pending before the Social Court: – S 42 AY 32/19 -), for April 2019 by decision of April 5, 2019, as amended by the appeal decision of April 25, 2019 (action pending before the Social Court: – S 42 AY 63/19 -), and for May 2019 by payment of €179.73 (an action is also pending against the appeal decision of May 10, 2019: – S 42 AY 82/19). By decision dated June 6, 2019, the respondent granted the applicant benefits – without change in amount – of €180.49 each for January and February 2019 and €179.73 per month for March through June 2019. Whether the applicant filed an objection to this decision is unknown to the court based on the case file (as of June 2019). No decision has yet been issued regarding the applicant's application from May 2019 for permission to move into a shared apartment with his pregnant girlfriend (expected delivery date in December 2019), a German citizen; the applicant has acknowledged paternity in this regard.

In the appeal proceedings, the applicant continues to argue that he still cannot meet the requirements of the Lebanese embassy for the issuance of a national passport, in particular the presentation of a valid residence permit, and that any restriction of his entitlement pursuant to Section 14 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) must be limited in time. To substantiate the urgency of the matter, he has submitted a sworn affidavit dated June 18, 2019, and current bank statements to the court file.

The respondent considers the Social Court's decision to be correct and argues that the applicant has expressly refused any cooperation in the immigration proceedings. The applicant still has relatives in Lebanon, through whom or by engaging a trusted lawyer he could obtain identity documents in order to fulfill his obligations to cooperate in some way.

For further details of the facts and the legal arguments, reference is made to the contents of the case file, the court files consulted by the Social Court (- S 42 AY 19/19 -, – S 42 AY 20/19 – and – S 42 AY 32/19 -) as well as the respondent's benefit and immigration files (4 volumes and 3 folders).

II.

The appeal, which was filed in due form and time (§ 173 SGG) and is also admissible in all other respects, and is permissible with a monthly claim exceeding €175.00 (§ 172 para. 3 no. 1 SGG in conjunction with § 144 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 1 SGG; cf. regarding the determination of the value of the subject matter of the appeal within the meaning of § 144 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 1 SGG in preliminary injunction proceedings concerning ongoing subsistence benefits, Senate decision of December 12, 2016 – L 8 AY 51/16 B ER – juris para. 8), is well-founded. The Social Court wrongly rejected the application for a preliminary injunction.

The application for interim relief seeks the issuance of a preliminary injunction pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG) and is admissible as such. It is not to be assessed in accordance with Section 86b Paragraph 1 of the SGG, according to which the court may, inter alia, order the suspensive effect in whole or in part in cases where an objection or appeal does not have suspensive effect (No. 2). Ordering the suspensive effect of the actions (- S 42 AY 19/19 – and – S 42 AY 20/19 -) against the benefit restriction imposed since October 2017 pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) would not achieve the applicant's objective of legal protection, because the granting of benefits pursuant to Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG cannot extend to subsequent periods until September 2017. It was not granted by an indefinite approval (so-called permanent administrative act), but rather on a temporary basis, month by month, initially for the months of March and April 2017 by decision of April 4, 2017, and subsequently by payment of the benefit amount (see the acknowledgments of receipt on pages 81, 93, 96, 99, 101, 118, 125 and 131 of the benefit file; regarding the so-called implied approval by payment of the benefit, see, for example, BSG, judgment of June 17, 2008 – B 8 AY 11/07 R – juris para. 10).

Preliminary injunctions are permissible under Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG) to regulate a provisional state of affairs with regard to a disputed legal relationship if such regulation appears necessary to avert substantial disadvantages. A prerequisite for issuing a preliminary injunction is that a right asserted against the respondent exists (claim for an injunction) and that the applicant would suffer substantial disadvantages without the issuance of the requested injunction (ground for an injunction). Both the sufficient probability of a substantive claim to performance and the urgency of the regulation to avert substantial disadvantages must be substantiated (Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 4 SGG in conjunction with Section 920 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO)).

A claim for an injunction exists if the applicant is highly likely to be entitled to the main claim to be secured, i.e., if a preliminary assessment of the main proceedings, based on a summary review, shows that the applicant's success in the main proceedings is highly probable. According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, decision of May 12, 2005 – 1 BvR 569/05 – NVwZ 2005, 927), decisions in preliminary injunction proceedings for actions to set aside a decision and (as in this case) for actions to take effect may, in principle, be based on both a balancing of interests and a summary review of the prospects of success in the main proceedings. However, Article 19 Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law (GG) sets special requirements for the design of the preliminary injunction proceedings if, without the granting of preliminary legal protection, serious and unreasonable impairments could arise that cannot be averted in any other way and that could no longer be remedied by the main proceedings. In such a case, according to the aforementioned decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, if the courts wish to base their decision on the prospects of success in the main proceedings, they must examine the facts and the law not merely summarily, but conclusively. If the courts decide to make a decision on this basis, they must not impose excessive requirements on the applicant's substantiation in the preliminary injunction proceedings; questions of fundamental rights protection must be taken into account. If, however, a complete clarification of the facts and the law is not possible for the court in the preliminary injunction proceedings, a balancing of interests must be carried out. In this case, too, the applicant's fundamental rights must be fully considered in the balancing process. This applies particularly when it comes to safeguarding human dignity. The courts must prevent any violation of this fundamental right, even if it only appears possible or is only temporary (Federal Constitutional Court, ibid., see also the Senate decisions of 2 April 2008 – L 8 SO 11/08 ER –, 13 May 2008 – L 8 SO 36/08 ER –, 22 October 2013 – L 8 SO 241/13 B ER –, 20 February 2014 – L 8 AY 98/13 B ER – juris para. 14 and most recently of 6 June 2019 – L 8 AY 17/19 B ER –).

In accordance with these guidelines, the Senate decides based on a balancing of interests, because, according to the current state of facts and dispute, the amount of the applicant's entitlement to benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) cannot be assessed with certainty without further investigations, both legally and factually, and it is not the task of the preliminary legal protection proceedings (in the second instance) in this individual case to clarify the facts in detail.

The dispute between the parties, which is subject to a preliminary injunction, concerns, firstly, the benefit award for November 2018 to February 2019, which is contested in the pending legal proceedings before the Social Court (S 42 AY 19/19) due to the express limitation of the subject matter of the proceedings. In this respect, the respondent, in response to the applicant's objection of January 25, 2019, reviewed the (initial) decision of September 28, 2017, despite the expiration of the one-month appeal period (§ 84 para. 1 sentence 1 of the Social Court Procedure Act), and rejected the granting of higher benefits for the period from November 1, 2018. The decision of September 28, 2017, is to be interpreted as an open-ended benefit decision (so-called permanent administrative act) in accordance with general principles (§§ 133, 157 of the German Civil Code). A continuing administrative act exists if its regulatory content, from the time of its issuance, is intended to have a lasting legal effect, extending beyond a one-time alteration of the legal situation to a certain definite or indefinite period in the future (regarding continuing administrative acts in social assistance, see, for example, Federal Social Court [BSG], judgment of February 2, 2012 – B 8 SO 5/10 R – juris para. 21). The decisive factor in assessing the period for which benefits are to be granted is, in accordance with Sections 133 and 157 of the German Civil Code (BGB), how a recipient must understand the declaration based on the circumstances of the individual case (Federal Social Court [BSG], judgment of June 17, 2008 – B 8/9b AY 1/07 R – juris para. 11). As a rule, an approval extending beyond the specifically named benefit period can only be assumed if the approval was granted without specifying an end date "from" a certain date, with effect from a certain date "for the future" or "until further notice", or if the circumstances of the case, for example from previous benefit notices, indicate that the benefit recipient was aware of the continued effect of the approval (established case law of the Senate, cf., for example, judgment of 25 February 2016 – L 8 AY 85/13 – and Senate decision of 10 March 2016 – L 8 SO 322/15 B ER – as well as of 6 April 2017 – L 8 SO 96/17 B ER -).

Based on this, the operative clause of the decision dated September 28, 2017, which is primarily decisive for the interpretation, states that the applicant is granted benefits in the amount of €180.49 "for the month of October 2017," and thus suggests a provision for benefits limited to one month. However, the first line of the justification states that the applicant will receive benefits pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) "from October 1, 2017." From the perspective of a recipient of the decision familiar with the facts, this wording indicates a fundamental change in the provision of benefits to the level of restricted benefits under Section 1a AsylbLG for an indefinite period. Even considering previous decisions, a different interpretation is not readily apparent, as a consistent decision-making practice was not unequivocally discernible to the applicant. With the exception of the decisions dated July 4, 2016, and April 4, 2017, which regulated benefits for June and July 2016 and March and April 2017, the respondent has not issued any written decisions granting benefits in the past period. This conclusion is not altered even if the decision of September 28, 2017, is considered a so-called basic decision regarding the general reduction of benefits pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) (for the future), because this decision implicitly includes the rejection of analogous benefits pursuant to Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG – with continuing effect for an indefinite period (see Federal Social Court, judgment of October 30, 2013 – B 7 AY 7/12 R – juris para. 15).

The expedited proceedings also affect the legal proceedings pending before the Social Court concerning the granting of benefits for the months of March (- S 42 AY 32/19 -), April (- S 42 AY 63/19 -) and May 2019 (- S 42 AY 82/19 -). The decisions of February 15, 2019 (as amended by the appeal decision of March 21, 2019, for March 2019), April 5, 2019 (as amended by the appeal decision of April 25, 2019, for April 2019), and the award of benefits by payment of benefits (as amended by the appeal decision of May 10, 2019, for May 2019) did not become the subject of the already pending legal proceedings (- S 42 AY 19/19 -) pursuant to Section 96 of the Social Court Act (SGG), because the applicant expressly limited the scope of these proceedings to February 28, 2019. Whether the award of benefits from June 2019 onwards – regulated, inter alia, by the respondent's decision of June 6, 2019 – was challenged by the applicant cannot be determined based on the Senate's current knowledge. However, due to the circumstances of the individual case, in which the applicant has challenged all of the respondent's orders, and the (probably) still unexpired objection period, this circumstance does not preclude a preliminary injunction.

Whether the applicant's entitlement to benefits (in terms of amount) is to be assessed according to Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 1, Section 3 Paragraph 2, or Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) since the end of January 2019 cannot be determined with certainty based on the current state of the proceedings. Further investigations into the facts are required.

The applicant is entitled to benefits as the holder of a tolerated stay permit pursuant to Section 1 Paragraph 1 No. 4 AsylbLG.

According to Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) (in the version applicable since October 24, 2015, dated October 20, 2015, Federal Law Gazette I 1722; previously Section 1a No. 2 AsylbLG), persons entitled to benefits under Section 1 Paragraph 1 Nos. 4 and 5 AsylbLG, i.e., persons subject to enforceable deportation with or without tolerated stay, for whom deportation measures cannot be enforced for reasons attributable to them, receive benefits in accordance with Section 1a Paragraph 2 AsylbLG. For them, the entitlement to benefits under Sections 2, 3, and 6 AsylbLG ends on the day following the enforceability of a deportation threat or deportation order (Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 2 AsylbLG). Abuse of benefits within the meaning of Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) includes, in particular, a violation of the obligation stipulated in Section 48 Paragraph 3 of the Residence Act (AufenthG) for a foreigner without a valid passport or passport substitute to cooperate in obtaining an identity document and establishing their identity and nationality (Federal Social Court [BSG], Judgment of May 12, 2017 – B 7 AY 1/16 R – juris para. 15 with further references to the predecessor provision of Section 1a No. 2 AsylbLG aF). A restriction of benefits under Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 AsylbLG further requires that the foreigner has engaged in culpable conduct and that this conduct is the cause of the unenforceability of measures terminating their residence. The Federal Social Court has thus far left open the question of whether merely negligent conduct can also fulfill the elements of a restriction of benefits (Federal Social Court [BSG], ibid., para. 17). In addition, the immigration office must make a serious effort to return the person concerned to his country of origin (BSG, aaO, Rn. 18 with further references).

Based on these criteria, the fact that the applicant has refused any cooperation in obtaining documents (national passport, extract from the register) since at least mid-2018, in principle, indicates a violation of identity-related obligations under Section 48 of the Residence Act (AufenthG) and thus supports the application of Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). According to Section 48 Paragraph 3 of the Residence Act, a foreigner who does not possess a valid passport or passport substitute is obligated to cooperate in obtaining an identity document and to present, hand over, and surrender to the authorities responsible for enforcing this law, upon request, all documents, other records, and data carriers in their possession that may be relevant for establishing their identity and nationality and for determining and asserting a possibility of return to another country. According to administrative court rulings, the foreigner is thus obligated – also taking into account the situation in Lebanon (more on this below) – not only to submit the required documents and appear in person at the foreign mission of his home country, but also, if the identity document is not issued to him within a reasonable time, to regularly inquire about its status, to ask about the reasons for the processing time, and to persistently request the issuance of the document (see Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg, judgment of October 16, 2018 – OVG 3 B 4.18 – juris para. 22; Administrative Court of Munich, decision of September 5, 2018 – M 25 S 18.2249 – juris para. 17; Administrative Court of Hamburg, judgment of November 2, 2010 – 8 K 1605/10 – juris para. 20). However, the immigration authority must have specifically informed the individual of their legal obligations to cooperate, e.g., regarding the procurement of identity documents (§ 48 para. 3 of the Residence Act), in order to be able to draw negative consequences under residence law from a lack of cooperation (Federal Administrative Court, judgment of October 26, 2010 – 1 C 18/09 – juris para. 17). Furthermore, § 82 para. 3 sentence 1 of the Residence Act imposes an obligation on the immigration authority to provide information, as it generally has better contacts and knowledge regarding the existing possibilities for obtaining travel documents (Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg, judgment of February 21, 2017 – OVG 3 B 14.16 – juris para. 24 with further references).

These principles are to be applied to the assessment of conduct relevant to benefit entitlement under Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), however, with the proviso of a restrictive interpretation relating to clear and persistent violations of obligations to cooperate under immigration law (see, for example, Senate decision of June 6, 2019 – L 8 AY 17/19 B ER –; see also Oppermann, in jurisPK-SGB XII, 2nd ed. 2014, Section 1a AsylbLG, 2nd revision, para. 122; regarding the restrictive interpretation of Section 1a AsylbLG in its old version, see already Social Court Hildesheim, decision of December 27, 2012 – S 42 AY 9/12 ER – juris para. 4 with further references; Social Court Hamburg, decision of August 7, 2014 – S 20 AY 111/10 – juris para. 51). mwN).

In this particular case, special consideration must be given to the specific circumstances arising from the applicant's nationality, which is not in doubt by the immigration office. The Senate is also aware from other court proceedings that the Lebanese Embassy makes the issuance of a national passport, in accordance with the information sheet submitted by the applicant, contingent upon proof of a valid residence permit or an assurance from the immigration office that the passport is required for the issuance or renewal of such a permit. This is confirmed by the contents of the files consulted, in particular by the internal email correspondence between the immigration office and the benefits office dated February 27, 2019 (page 391 of the benefits file and page 291 of the immigration file), according to which obtaining a passport for Lebanese nationals abroad is only possible to a limited extent, and according to the experience of the immigration office employee who provided the information, it has not yet happened that a Lebanese national subject to deportation has received a substitute passport document. In the Senate's view, these special circumstances lead to increased requirements for the immigration office to specify the applicant's obligations to cooperate, particularly regarding the (generally reasonable) procurement of birth certificates, civil status extracts, or other extracts from registers kept in the applicant's home country, involving relatives living abroad or trusted lawyers. This potential misconduct was pointed out by the respondent's immigration office, for example, in internal communications dated March 21, 2019, and April 25, 2019 (pp. 386, 517 of the immigration file). However, the files do not indicate that the applicant was also informed—even orally—by the immigration office of the available options for obtaining travel documents, possibly with further assistance (such as providing information on the responsible authorities in Lebanon and the requirements for issuing documents with the involvement of relatives or trusted lawyers, or providing a corresponding list of lawyers). This is to the detriment of the respondent, who bears the objective burden of proof for the facts restricting the claim (cf. Senate judgment of 8 December 2016 – L 8 AY 33/13 –; Oppermann in jurisPK-SGB XII, 2nd ed. 2014, § 1a AsylbLG, 2nd revision, para. 90).

The legal consequences of the respondent's failure to limit the benefit restriction under Section 1a Paragraph 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), contrary to the requirement in Section 14 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG, need not be definitively answered here (this question was also left open in the Senate's decision of July 3, 2019 – L 8 AY 9/19 -). Legal precedent and literature generally hold that an indefinite restriction of benefits is unlawful per se due to a violation of the principle of proportionality (Bavarian State Social Court, decision of March 19, 2018 – L 18 AY 7/18 B ER – juris para. 24; Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania State Social Court, decision of June 21, 2018 – L 9 AY 1/18 B ER – juris para. 47; Baden-Württemberg State Social Court, decision of June 18, 2018 – L 7 AY 1511/18 ER-B – juris para. 10; Magdeburg Social Court, decision of September 30, 2018 – S 25 AY 21/18 ER – juris para. 23; Oppermann in jurisPK-SGB XII, 2nd ed. 2014, § 14 para. 9). ff.; Cantzler, AsylbLG, 1st ed. 2019, § 14 para. 10).

Under these circumstances, it cannot be answered without doubt whether, in the event that a restriction of entitlement under Section 1a AsylbLG proves to be unlawful after further investigation of the facts, the applicant should not even be granted benefits at the level of social assistance under Section 2 Paragraph 1 AsylbLG.

According to Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), and deviating from Sections 3 and 4 as well as 6 to 7 of the AsylbLG, the Social Code, Book XII (SGB XII) applies accordingly to those benefit recipients who have resided in Germany for 15 months without significant interruption and have not themselves abusively influenced the duration of their stay. According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Social Court (BSG) (fundamental ruling: judgment of June 17, 2008 – B 8/9b AY 1/07 R – juris Rn. 32 ff.), abusive conduct in this sense requires, objectively speaking, dishonest behavior disapproved of by the legal system, which, subjectively speaking, is intentionally carried out with the awareness of the objectively possible influence on the duration of stay. Influence on the duration of stay exists even if, from a general and abstract perspective, the abusive conduct can typically extend the duration of stay. It is irrelevant whether the abusive conduct occurred during the stay in Germany. Abuse of rights can also be based on conduct prior to entry into Germany (Federal Social Court, loc. cit., para. 40). However, given the punitive nature of Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), not just any conduct that is in any way reprehensible is sufficient. The nature, extent, and consequences of the breach of duty must be so serious for the foreigner that the breach must also be given considerable weight within the framework of the principle of proportionality. Therefore, only conduct that is inexcusable (socially unacceptable), taking into account the individual case, the specific situation of the foreigner in Germany, and the particular characteristics of the AsylbLG, leads to the exclusion of analogous benefits (Federal Social Court, loc. cit., para. 33).

The applicant, who has been residing in Germany since at least the beginning of November 2015, fulfills the temporal requirements for entitlement to so-called analogous benefits. However, the elements of abuse of rights within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) are not met simply because the applicant has refused to leave Germany voluntarily since his entry. An abuse of rights within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG cannot be inferred merely from the fact that an asylum seeker, provided that departure was reasonable for him, has not left voluntarily (Federal Social Court, Judgment of June 17, 2008 – B 8/9b AY 1/07 R – juris para. 35). What is required is socially unacceptable behavior that goes beyond simply failing to leave the country, taking into account the individual case, and which contains not only an objective but also a subjective component (intent relating to the action influencing the length of stay, with the aim of influencing the length of stay) (Federal Social Court, Judgment of June 17, 2008 – B 8 AY 9/07 R – juris para. 15). Even if the applicant were to be held culpably liable for violating his obligations under residence law pursuant to Section 48 Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the Residence Act from 2017 or mid-2018 onwards, it is still necessary, taking into account the circumstances of the individual case and the principle of proportionality, to examine whether the applicant's refusal to leave, which has been evident since at least mid-2018, constitutes sufficiently socially unacceptable behavior within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. In this context, it may still be necessary to examine whether an abuse of rights can be ruled out in light of the practice of the Lebanese embassy, ​​because any obligation of the foreigner concerned to leave the country could not have been enforced in any case during the entire period from the time of the abuse of rights, regardless of his conduct (cf. BSG, judgment of – B 8/9b AY 1/07 R – juris para. 44).

The balancing of interests, to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), is in favor of the applicant, also because there is a sufficient probability that he is entitled to benefits under Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). After the 15-month period stipulated in Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG has expired, the conversion of benefits to the level of social assistance is the standard procedure. Furthermore, the consequences of a restriction of entitlement under Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the AsylbLG in conjunction with Section 1a Paragraph 2 of the AsylbLG are so serious that, in cases of doubt, i.e., uncertainty regarding the existence of the factual prerequisites, no restriction of the entitlement to benefits should occur (Senate Decision of June 6, 2019 – L 8 AY 17/19 B ER -). Whether Section 1a Paragraph 3 Sentence 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in conjunction with Section 1a Paragraph 2 of the AsylbLG is compatible with the fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living in accordance with Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) need not be answered in the present proceedings (also left open by the Senate decision of October 25, 2017 – L 8 AY 19/17 B ER – with further references; for the state of the opinion, see also Deibel, Sozialrechtaktuell 2019, p. 52, para. 3). The applicant has also credibly demonstrated the particular urgency of the matter (ground for the order) by means of the affidavit of June 18, 2019.

For administrative reasons, the interim order applies to the period from 1 February 2019 – a retroactive regulation from the date of receipt of the urgent application by the Social Court on 25 January 2019 does not appear necessary due to the benefits to be paid retroactively as a result of the Senate's decision – and is dependent on a legally binding decision regarding the benefit awards granted to the applicant under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the period up to May 2019 in the legal proceedings pending before the Social Court (- S 42 AY 19/19 -, - S 42 AY 32/19 -, - S 42 AY 63/19 - and - S 42 AY 82/19 -) as well as up to December 2019, which are not known to the Senate in detail at the current stage of proceedings. In order to enable the necessary investigations of the facts (ex officio) and not to unduly burden the respondent, the order is limited in time until the end of December 2019. In this regard, the Senate also took into account the expected due date of the applicant's girlfriend.

The decision on costs is based on § 193 SGG.

The applicant's request for legal aid for the appeal proceedings must be rejected. Because the respondent has been legally obligated to reimburse the extrajudicial costs for the proceedings in the first and second instances, there is no longer a need for legal protection for the legal aid application (similarly, Federal Constitutional Court, decision of August 1, 2017 – 1 BvR 1910/12 – juris para. 20).

This decision is final and cannot be appealed, § 177 SGG.