VERDICT
In the legal dispute
xxx,
Plaintiff,
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam,
Lange Geismarstraße 55, 37073 Göttingen,
against
State of Hesse, represented by the Regional Council of Gießen,
Landgraf-Philipp-Platz 1-7, 35390 Gießen,
Defendant,
The 12th Chamber of the Social Court of Kassel, on November 19, 2020, through the presiding judge, Judge xxx, and the lay judges Mr. xxx and Mr. xxx, rendered the following judgment without oral proceedings:
- The decision of April 8, 2020, as amended by the appeal decision of July 2, 2020, is modified and the defendant is ordered to grant the plaintiff, for the period from October 1, 2019 to May 26, 2020, benefits as a single adult based on standard benefit level 1 pursuant to Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 1, Paragraph 2 No. 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), taking into account the benefits already granted to him at the same time and on the same basis.
- The defendant must reimburse the plaintiff for the costs of the legal proceedings.
- The appeal is admitted.
FACTS
The parties are in dispute over the granting of higher benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the period from October 1, 2019 to May 26, 2020.
The plaintiff, born on [date redacted] 2000, originating from Guinea, and according to the records unmarried and single, first entered the Federal Republic of Germany via Spain in December 2017. His subsequent registration at the initial reception center of the State of Hesse in Gießen took place on February 27, 2018, and the plaintiff ultimately applied for asylum at the responsible branch office of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in Gießen on March 1, 2018. On March 13, 2018, the BAMF branch office in Bochum issued a decision regarding the plaintiff's transfer to Spain, and his temporary residence permit expired on March 27, 2018. The plaintiff's transfer to Spain then took place on June 6, 2018.
On July 24, 2018, the plaintiff re-entered the Federal Republic of Germany and was admitted to the initial reception center of the state of Hesse on July 30, 2018. Also on July 30, 2018, the plaintiff applied to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) for further asylum proceedings, and was subsequently granted benefits pursuant to Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) by a decision dated July 30, 2018.
On September 11, 2018, the BAMF branch office in Bayreuth issued a further decision regarding the transfer of the plaintiff to Spain.
At the same time, by decision of the defendant, in this case the Gießen Regional Council – Initial Reception Center of the State of Hesse, dated December 11, 2018, the plaintiff was granted, from December 11, 2018, only reduced benefits to cover his needs for food and accommodation, including heating, personal care, and health, as benefits in kind pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 3 in conjunction with Sections 3 and 4 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for a period of six months. The restriction of benefits was based on the defendant's opinion that, for reasons attributable to the plaintiff himself, measures to terminate his stay could not have been carried out.
On January 8, 2019, the plaintiff was finally transferred to Spain again.
On April 3, 2019, the plaintiff re-entered the Federal Republic of Germany and applied to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) on the same day for further asylum proceedings. However, a subsequent application was deemed inadmissible there, as a legal action was already pending.
By decision dated April 3, 2019, the defendant in Gießen initially granted the plaintiff benefits again pursuant to Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). However, by decision of the defendant, the Gießen Regional Council – Initial Reception Center of the State of Hesse, dated April 24, 2019, these benefits were subsequently reduced, effective April 24, 2019, for a period of six months, to the benefits deemed absolutely necessary under the circumstances, pursuant to Section 1a Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG. The justification given for this reduction included the fact that the plaintiff had re-entered Germany for the purpose of claiming social benefits.
However, by decision of 25 September 2019, the decision of 24 April 2019 was revoked and the plaintiff was granted benefits under Section 3 Paragraph 1 No. 1 AsylbLG aF for the period from 24 April 2019 to 31 August 2019 and, from 1 September 2019 as a single person, benefits under Section 3 a Paragraph 1 No. 2 b AsylbLG nF.
Subsequently, the plaintiff, as a single person, was granted benefits pursuant to Section 3 in conjunction with Section 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) by decision dated November 19, 2019, effective October 1, 2020. The plaintiff, through his legal representative, filed an objection to this decision on November 29, 2019, arguing that, as a single person, he was only entitled to benefits pursuant to Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, and Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the AsylbLG, and therefore, by analogy, only benefits at standard benefit level 2 or 2b. By decision of the State of Hesse, Gießen Regional Council – Initial Reception Center of the State of Hesse, dated February 20, 2020, the objection of November 24, 2019, against the decision of November 19, 2019, was rejected.
By amended decision dated April 8, 2020, the plaintiff was granted benefits pursuant to Section 3 in conjunction with Section 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) effective January 1, 2020. This amendment, still based on standard benefit level 2b, was initially retroactive due to the adjustment of the standard benefit rates and levels in the AsylbLG as of January 1, 2020. Simultaneously, however, the plaintiff's entitlements were also recalculated for the periods from October 1, 2019, to November 30, 2019, and from December 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019, including a resulting back payment.
On April 29, 2020, the plaintiff, through his legal representative, finally filed an objection to the decision of April 8, 2020. In this objection, after reviewing the case file, he argued that the provision, in effect since September 1, 2019, of benefits at standard benefit level 2 for single individuals living in communal accommodation, or at standard benefit level 2b for those living in a reception center, as in this case, was unconstitutional. In support of his argument and further detailed explanation, the plaintiff cited, among other things, relevant case law of the Federal Constitutional Court and an expert opinion from the German Caritas Association. The latter, he argued, was based on the premise that the legislature, without empirical evidence of corresponding savings potential, assumed, among other things, supposed communities of shared fate, a pooling of resources, and financial synergies, which did not reflect the reality in refugee accommodations, as he elaborated in detail. No significant discrepancy had been demonstrated. The benefits provided were therefore clearly insufficient and fell below the constitutionally mandated minimum subsistence level, which was also further explained.
On May 27, 2020, the plaintiff was subsequently assigned to the city of Kassel and housed there in communal accommodation.
According to the files, the latter occurred seamlessly from the plaintiff's rehabilitation treatment at the Neurological Clinic of the BDH Clinic Braunfels, where the plaintiff had been undergoing inpatient neurological rehabilitation treatment (phase C) since December 2, 2019. This in turn was preceded by inpatient hospital treatment in the neurosurgery department of the University Medicine Giessen from October 21, 2019 to December 2, 2019, all of which were based on, among other things, tuberculous spondylitis at the level of T10, an incomplete spinal cord injury from T10, abdominal lymph node tuberculosis, urinary incontinence and hepatitis B.
The Gießen Regional Council, as the competent appeals authority, subsequently rejected the plaintiff's objection to the decision of April 8, 2020, as unfounded by decision of July 2, 2020.
The justification given was that the legal basis for the plaintiff's entitlement to benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) derives from Sections 3(1) and (2), and 3a(1) No. 2b of the AsylbLG. According to these provisions, eligible individuals accommodated in an initial reception center pursuant to Section 44 of the Asylum Act (AsylG) are entitled to basic benefits. Provided that the necessary personal needs pursuant to Section 3(1) Sentence 2 of the AsylbLG are fully covered by cash benefits, the monthly amount for eligible adults is €136 if they do not live in an apartment because they are accommodated in a reception center. There are no concerns regarding the formal legality of the decision. Furthermore, the decision is also substantively lawful. The plaintiff is not entitled to higher benefits under the AsylbLG. Section 2b newly establishes a special needs level for adults who are housed – alone, with a partner, or with other adults – in reception centers, communal accommodations, or comparable other accommodations (collective accommodations), and also assigns them to needs level 2 (= 90% of needs level 1). The reason for limiting the benefit rate in these cases is the special needs situation in collective accommodations, where it is assumed that communal accommodation results in cost savings for the residents of such accommodations (e.g., in media use, but also in the procurement of food) that are comparable to those in two-person households (Bundestag printed matter 19/10052, p. 23). The decision on the constitutionality of a law rests with the Federal Constitutional Court. Until then, Section 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is valid law and therefore applicable. The objection is therefore to be rejected.
On July 4, 2020, the plaintiff, through his legal representative, filed a lawsuit with the Social Court in Kassel against the decision of April 8, 2020, as amended by the appeal decision of July 2, 2020, concerning the provision of benefits from October 1, 2019 to May 26, 2020, arguing, for the aforementioned reasons and further explanations, that he should receive benefits at a higher level than the standard benefit level 2b.
He states, among other things:
"The provisions of Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) are clearly unconstitutional, as they violate the fundamental right to a dignified minimum standard of living guaranteed by Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) in conjunction with the social state principle of Article 20 Paragraph 1 GG (cf. Federal Constitutional Court decision of February 9, 2010 – Case No.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175) and contravene the general principle of equality, Article 3 Paragraph 1 GG.".
The fundamental right to a dignified minimum standard of living guarantees every person in need of assistance the material prerequisites that are essential for their physical existence and for a minimum level of participation in social, cultural and political life (Federal Constitutional Court, 09.02.2010 – Case No.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175, 1st LS).
The fundamental right applies equally to German and foreign nationals residing in the Federal Republic of Germany (Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 18 July 2012 – Case No.: 1 BvL 10/10, BVerfGE 132, 134, 2nd LS).
To determine the scope of the claim, the legislator must assess all essential living expenses realistically and comprehensibly in a transparent and appropriate procedure based on reliable figures and conclusive calculation methods (Federal Constitutional Court of 09.02.2010 – Case No.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175, 3rd LS).
Consideration of the specific needs of certain groups of people when determining the minimum standard of living that ensures human dignity may only be given under strict conditions. Differentiation is only possible if their need for essential services differs significantly from that of other people in need, and this can be logically demonstrated in a transparent process based on the actual needs of that specific group (Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of July 18, 2012 – Case No.: 1 BvL 10/10, BVerfGE 132, 134, 3rd LS).
The fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living that ensures human dignity requires a review of the basis and methodology for calculating benefits to determine whether they meet the objective of this fundamental right. The protection of this fundamental right also extends to the procedure for determining the minimum standard of living because a review of the outcome against the standard of this fundamental right is only possible to a limited extent. In order to guarantee the comprehensibility of the scope of statutory assistance commensurate with the importance of this fundamental right, as well as its judicial review, the determination of benefits must be justifiable on the basis of reliable figures and sound calculation methods (Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of February 9, 2010 – Case No.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175, para. 109).
Regarding the specific needs of those entitled to benefits pursuant to Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), the legislator has not conducted any investigations.
The needs of those entitled to benefits under Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) do not differ significantly from the needs of single adult benefit recipients living in an apartment as defined in Section 8 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Standard Needs Assessment Act. Consequently, the legislator has not even attempted to demonstrate the discrepancy in a transparent procedure based on the actual needs of this specific group.
Rather, the legislator merely asserts that it can be assumed that communal accommodation results in savings for the residents of such accommodations that are comparable to those in couple households.
The concept of savings through shared finances, expressed in needs assessment level 2 for couples, can be applied to benefit recipients who share certain facilities (kitchen, bathrooms, common rooms, etc.) in communal accommodations. Here, too, the shared use of living space enables synergy effects, as certain household-related expenses are not borne by each benefit recipient individually, but are divided among the residents or shared by them collectively. This applies, for example, to personal media needs, since landline or internet connections are regularly provided for communal use in communal accommodations. Further savings result, under the aforementioned conditions, from the possibility of shared use or exchange regarding leisure, entertainment, and cultural needs (Section 9 of the 2013 Income and Expenditure Survey). Furthermore, accommodation in communal housing would result in savings on necessary food supplies (Section 1 of the 2013 Income and Expenditure Survey), for example, by purchasing food or at least basic kitchen supplies in larger quantities and using them together in communal kitchens. The resulting savings for adult residents of communal housing are comparable to those achieved in two-person households (Explanatory Memorandum, Bundestag Printed Matter 19/10052, p. 24).
When regulating the design of subsistence benefits, the legislature has discretion to make a standardized assessment of the circumstances, based on actual needs, to determine the necessary subsistence benefits, provided this assessment does not appear unreasonable. The Federal Government made this assessment based on the assumption that residents of communal accommodation can achieve the described cost savings, comparable to those of couples, through shared financial management. Those entitled to benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) who are housed in communal accommodation can be expected to manage their finances jointly, going beyond simply sharing accommodation-related expenses. These individuals, regardless of their origin, are in the same life situation during the asylum process and, in effect, form a community of shared fate. Their right of residence in Germany has not yet been definitively established. They participate in language courses and integration measures and, as newly arrived refugees, are in a comparable transitional situation that binds them together. Shared accommodation with other benefit recipients facilitates the swift processing of applications. In this exceptional temporal and spatial situation, they have a duty to make all reasonable efforts to get along with one another in the communal accommodation (explanatory memorandum, BT-Drucksache 19/10052, p. 24).
The reason given for the reduction in benefits is an alleged "solidarity in communal accommodation" and the resulting synergy and cost savings effects (explanatory memorandum, BT-Drucksache 19/10052, p. 25).
In fact, people living together do not benefit from cost savings comparable to those of couples living alone, because they do not manage their finances jointly. According to the Federal Social Court's rulings on cohabiting couples, the requirements for shared financial management extend beyond the shared use of a bathroom, kitchen, and possibly common areas (Federal Social Court, August 23, 2012 – Case No.: B 4 AS 34/12 R): Even the common practice in shared accommodation of jointly purchasing basic foodstuffs, cleaning supplies, and toiletries from a communal fund contributed equally by all residents does not, in itself, establish a shared financial community. The decisive factor is that the household is managed by both partners, with their respective contributions depending on their individual economic and physical capabilities. The actual management of the household and the covering of household expenses must be carried out jointly by both partners, which, however, does not mean that the financial contribution to the household or the value of the household management itself must be equal. An agreement between the partners on how they will divide the household responsibilities for the benefit of their relationship is sufficient.
A shared economic model, similar to that of partners, does not exist in refugee accommodations; corresponding opportunities to request support from other benefit recipients are not available. The legislature cannot refer benefit recipients to cost-saving measures that they cannot implement.
The German Caritas Association, based on its many years of experience working with refugees, also doubts that this form of accommodation will result in cost savings for the residents and considers the creation of a separate needs-based benefit category, which means a further reduction in benefits for those affected, to be unjustified. It can reasonably be expected that family members living together in a family unit will manage their finances together. Empirical evidence could demonstrate the associated cost savings (Federal Constitutional Court – Case No.: 1 BvR 371/11). In contrast, the potential for cost savings associated with accommodation in refugee shelters is neither empirically (sufficiently) proven nor plausible. The assumption that strangers, whose only connection is living in the anonymity of mass accommodations, would develop a sense of solidarity through a supposed "community of fate" (explanatory memorandum, p. 27), resulting in financial synergies for the residents, does not reflect the reality in refugee accommodations. Rather, a prerequisite for shared economic activity is a solid foundation of mutual trust. Whether this can develop between strangers under these circumstances is doubtful. The constant turnover in refugee accommodations alone typically prevents the development of such close relationships. The fact that residents regularly come from different regions and cultures, which can lead to communication difficulties and sometimes even conflicts, is a further obstacle to shared economic activity. Furthermore, according to the explanatory memorandum to the law, the expected savings are also supposed to result from the fact that "living space is shared, and household goods are purchased and used jointly" (explanatory memorandum, p. 23). However, benefits for this are not included in needs level 1, as they are provided separately (see Section 3, Paragraph 3, Sentence 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act). Therefore, no savings can be achieved for those affected. The proposed reduction in benefits is also inappropriate with regard to necessary personal needs. Due to the receipt of benefits in kind, this amount is often the only way for individuals to make self-determined decisions about a part of their own lives and to experience autonomy (Statement by the German Caritas Association on the draft bill for a Third Act Amending the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act of March 29, 2019).
No significant difference in needs has been demonstrated. On the contrary, everything suggests that the needs of those entitled to benefits under Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) do not differ from those of other single adult beneficiaries entitled to benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG).
The justification for the new standard benefit rate likely lies in the financial implications of the law. A model calculation of the effects of the reorganization of benefit rates and the increase in benefits has shown that the savings resulting from the reorganization (standard benefit rate 2 instead of standard benefit rate 1 for single benefit recipients in institutions, as well as the changes to benefit rates for adult benefit recipients without their own household) will amount to savings of approximately €40 million annually. The additional expenditures resulting from the adjustment of basic benefits based on the 2013 income and expenditure survey and its subsequent updates are also in the range of approximately €40 million annually (explanatory memorandum, Bundestag printed matter 19/10052, pp. 15-16). The new standard benefit rate is thus apparently intended to finance the adjustment of basic benefits that was neglected for three years.
Based on a need equivalent to the standard benefit level 1, which the legislator has determined for single persons, benefits amounting to only 90% of this subsistence-level level are clearly insufficient.
In the case of adult partners in a household receiving social assistance, the legislature may assume that joint management of finances results in savings and that, therefore, two cohabiting partners have a minimum financial need that is less than twice that of a single person managing their finances alone (cf. BVerfGE 8, 338 [342]). Since, due to their cohabitation, it can be assumed that both partners "share their finances," it is not objectionable that the legislature sets the same minimum need for both partners (Federal Constitutional Court, 09.02.2010 – Case No.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175, para. 121).
The requirement to cover the subsistence minimum for two partners, amounting to 180% of the corresponding requirement for a single person, is based on the modified difference calculation of the German Association for Public and Private Welfare, which formed the basis of Section 2 Paragraph 3 of the 1990 Standard Rate Ordinance. The German Association determined this value by selecting childless married couples with a net disposable income above the social assistance threshold as the reference group, determining their standard benefit-relevant consumption according to the same procedure as for a single person (i.e., considering only the individual expenditure items in the individual categories of the income and expenditure survey that were also considered for a single person), and then calculating the difference between the amounts for married couples and single persons. This method is suitable for determining the subsistence level of partners living in a household without children (cf. Federal Constitutional Court decision of 09.02.2010 – file no.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175, para. 155).
However, it has no bearing on the needs of those entitled to benefits within the meaning of Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), because their specific needs were not determined and no data on the specific needs of this group of people can be obtained from the evaluations of the income and expenditure survey (cf. regarding the failure to determine child-specific needs in the area of the German Social Code, Book II (SGB II), Federal Constitutional Court decision of February 9, 2010 – Case No.: 1 BvL 1/09, BVerfGE 125, 175, paragraphs 156 et seq.).
There is no plausible evidence to support the assumption that those entitled to benefits under Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) manage their finances jointly like partners in a household receiving benefits. They are also not mutually obligated to do so. There is no possibility of demanding corresponding support from other benefit recipients.
Rather, no differences in need are apparent compared to single adults entitled to benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) who live in an apartment as defined in Section 8 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Standard Needs Assessment Act, or compared to single adults entitled to benefits under Book XII of the German Social Code (SGB XII) who live in accommodation that is not communal accommodation as defined in Section 53 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Act or a reception facility as defined in Section 44 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Act (e.g., homeless shelters), which could justify unequal treatment. These groups of people are treated more favorably than the plaintiff without any sound justification, despite having the same needs. Furthermore, a violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) also arises from the fact that, despite evident differences in need, the plaintiff receives benefits at the same level as spouses
Furthermore, the plaintiff cites supporting case law from the social courts, including, but not limited to, the Social Court of Landshut (decision of October 24, 2019, S 11 AY 64/19 ER), the Social Court of Freiburg (decision of December 3, 2019, S 9 AY 4605/19 ER), the Social Court of Hanover (decision of December 20, 2019, S 53 AY 107/19 ER), the Social Court of Leipzig (decision of January 8, 2020, S 10 AY 40/19 ER), the Higher Social Court of Saxony (decision of March 23, 2020, L 8 AY 4/20 B ER), the Social Court of Frankfurt am Main (decision of January 14, 2020, S 30 AY 26/19 ER), and the Social Court of Dresden (decision of February 4, 2020). 2020, S 20 AY 86/19 ER). Furthermore, a personal statement regarding cohabitation in the accommodation he occupied during the period in dispute.
The plaintiff requests (in essence) that
the decision of April 8, 2020, as amended by the appeal decision of July 2, 2020, be modified and that the defendant be ordered to grant the plaintiff, for the period from October 1, 2019, to May 26, 2020, benefits as a single adult based on standard benefit level 1 pursuant to Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 1, Paragraph 2 No. 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), taking into account the benefits already granted to him at the same time and on the same basis under standard benefit level 2b.
The defendant requests
that the action be dismissed.
The defendant maintains the contested decisions. He refers to the explanations in the appeal decision.
For further details, in particular the further submissions of the parties, reference is made to the contents of the court file. This includes, in particular, the medical records included in the court file with the plaintiff's consent, which were submitted in a parallel case brought by the plaintiff against the City of Kassel (case no. S 12 AY 22/20 ER) and which have since been settled. Finally, reference is also made to the defendant's administrative files, the essential content of which pertains to the present legal dispute and was likewise the subject of the decision reached. The parties expressly agreed to a decision by the Chamber without oral proceedings pursuant to Section 124 Paragraph 2 of the Social Courts Act (SGG).
REASONS FOR DECISION
The legal dispute could be decided by the chamber without an oral hearing by judgment, after the parties had expressly agreed to this beforehand (§ 124 para. 2 SGG).
The action is admissible. In particular, it was filed in due form and time before the competent court (§§ 78, 90 SGG), whereby the subject matter of the present legal dispute – as the contested objection decision might suggest – does not only cover the period from January 1, 2020 to May 26, 2020, but the entire period from October 1, 2019 to May 26, 2020, since the contested decision of April 8, 2020 also retroactively recalculated the benefit amount from October 1, 2019 in favor of the plaintiff, resulting in a subsequent payment.
The action is ultimately well-founded.
The decision of April 8, 2020, as amended by the decision on the objection of July 2, 2020, is unlawful insofar as the defendant granted the plaintiff benefits solely under Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) from October 1, 2019, to May 26, 2020, and thus solely on the basis of standard benefit level 2b. Instead, taking into account the payments already granted to him concurrently from October 1, 2020, to May 26, 2020, the plaintiff is entitled, based on a constitutionally compliant interpretation to be undertaken here, to benefits under Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 1, Paragraph 2 No. 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), so that the defendant was to be ordered to pay accordingly. This is because, like Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 Number 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) as interpreted by the Social Court of Landshut (Judgment of October 14, 2020, S 11 AY 39/20, juris), Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 Number 2b, and Paragraph 2 Number 2b of the AsylbLG (Social Court of Landshut, Decision of January 23, 2020, S 11 AY 79/19) are, in the Chamber's opinion, to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitution, such that those entitled to benefits actually live together with at least one other person and that compatibility with the fundamental right to a dignified minimum standard of living (Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law), in particular with the procedural requirements of the Federal Constitutional Court, can only be achieved, among other reasons, through such a constitutionally compliant interpretation of Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 Number 1. The Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) and Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the AsylbLG as amended on August 15, 2019, can be assumed to apply. This means that the single, adult plaintiff is to be treated as equivalent to a single adult benefit recipient who lives alone in an apartment within the meaning of Section 8 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Standard Needs Assessment Act, and is therefore to be granted benefits corresponding to standard needs level 1, Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 1, Paragraph 2 No. 1 of the AsylbLG.
The adjudicating chamber first points out that its own previous case law, at least in preliminary legal protection proceedings (see the legally binding decision of July 13, 2020, S 12 AY 20/20 ER, in the aforementioned parallel case of the plaintiff against the City of Kassel), is also consistent with the constitutional court case law cited here regarding the requirements for the content and scope of subsistence-securing benefits and the determination of a dignified minimum standard of living, the statement of the German Caritas Association on the draft bill for a Third Act Amending the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act of March 29, 2019, also cited here, and the aforementioned social court case law (including the decision of the Landshut Social Court of October 24, 2019, S 11 AY 64/19 ER; and the decision of the Oldenburg Social Court of June 9, 2020, S 25 AY 21/20 ER), and in this respect also with the The Higher Social Court of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (decisions of May 11, 2020, L 9 AY 22/19 B ER and of June 10, 2020, L 9 AY 22/19 B ER, juris) already had significant concerns regarding the constitutionality of the benefit levels regulated in Section 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2 Letter b and Section 3a Paragraph 2 No. 2 Letter b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) – with the same legal effects as in the present case – for adult benefit recipients without partners who are accommodated in reception centers, shared households, or comparable accommodations. This also applies insofar as, as the Higher Social Court of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania held, a constitutionally compliant interpretation of the provision requires that, as an unwritten element of the offense, the actual and verifiable shared household management of the benefit recipient with other persons accommodated in the collective accommodation is presupposed, for which the objective burden of proof (and, in preliminary injunction proceedings, the burden of presentation) lies with the benefit provider. The constitutional concerns, with a resulting higher entitlement to benefits, would then be shared, at least in preliminary legal protection, not only by the Social Court of Landshut, but also by the Social Court of Frankfurt, decision of January 14, 2020, S 30 AY 26/19 ER, juris, and by the Social Court of Freiburg (Breisgau), decisions of December 3, 2019, S 9 AY 4605/19 ER, juris and of January 20, 2020, S 7 AY 5235/19 ER, juris). The Munich Social Court (decision of February 10, 2020, S 42 AY 82/19 ER) also held that the legislative construction of Section 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2 b), Paragraph 2 No. 2 b) of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) raises several difficult and unresolved constitutional questions. Differences in benefits between those entitled to benefits under the AsylbLG and those entitled to benefits under Book XII of the German Social Code (SGB XII) are only justified if and insofar as the needs of the two groups have been properly determined in a transparent process. However, in this case, such a survey of the consumer expenditures of those entitled to benefits under the AsylbLG is precisely what is lacking. Without such a survey, the legislator's blanket assumption that strangers regularly manage their finances together like spouses or partners in a non-marital cohabitation appears untenable. Synergy effects might not be achieved in some cases if other residents have been assessed as having limitations on their entitlement under Section 1a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) or if they receive benefits at lower standard rates. Furthermore, communal accommodations typically house people from different nations and cultural backgrounds who are strangers to one another. Therefore, it is likely that, given the generally limited benefits provided under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act, there will be no special sense of closeness or trust among the residents, which would normally form the basis for shared financial management.
In its decision of May 19, 2020 (case no. S 90 AY 57/20 ER, juris) against the City of Kassel in the plaintiff's preliminary injunction proceedings, the Berlin Social Court further held that the provisions of Section 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2 Letter b and Paragraph 2 No. 2 Letter b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitution during the period of contact restrictions to contain the coronavirus pandemic (SARS-CoV-2 Containment Measures Ordinance; juris: CoronaVV BE 3) to mean that they presuppose, as an unwritten element of the offense, the reasonable communal household management of the benefit recipient with other persons housed in the collective accommodation. If this is not the case, the benefit recipient must be granted benefits at the level of the standard benefit rate 1 for this reason alone.
All of this, after our own examination, also and especially on the basis of the significant health impairments of the plaintiff in the aforementioned proceedings S 12 AY 20/20 ER, with the consequence that, at least within the framework of a balancing of interests, the city of Kassel as the respondent was further obligated to grant the applicant there and the plaintiff here benefits on the basis of standard benefit level 1 instead of standard benefit level 2 from the date of receipt of the application until the decision in the main proceedings. In this respect, the Chamber adopted the aforementioned constitutional concerns raised by the plaintiff regarding the provisions of Section 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2 Letter b and Paragraph 2 No. 2 Letter b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) and further stated that, in the Chamber's opinion, there was also reason to fear, as the Social Court of Frankfurt (decision of January 14, 2020) had ruled, that the lower benefit level according to standard benefit level 2 would not cover the socio-cultural/humane minimum standard of living of the applicant in that case, which is protected by the fundamental right in Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law and also includes him in his capacity as an asylum seeker. On the other hand, a violation of the principle of equality under Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law is likely, because there are compelling reasons to believe that the needs of residents of collective accommodations or communal accommodations within the meaning of Section 53 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Act are not comparable to those of life partners or partners in cohabiting relationships, and thus the legislator treats unequal situations equally in Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 No. 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. According to the aforementioned provision, Section 28 of the German Social Code, Book XII (SGB XII), in conjunction with the Standard Needs Assessment Act and Sections 28a and 40 of the SGB XII, shall apply mutatis mutandis to beneficiaries under Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1, with the proviso that, in the case of accommodation in communal accommodation within the meaning of Section 53 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Act (AsylG) or in a reception facility under Section 44 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Act (AsylG), a standard need in the amount of standard need level 2 shall be recognized for each adult person (No. 1). This means that, for the single plaintiff, he is treated like a partner in a marital or cohabiting relationship with regard to the standard benefit level 2 applicable to him, even though the explanatory memorandum to the law shows that the new legal regulation was not preceded by any determinations regarding the specific needs of benefit recipients under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) who live in collective or communal accommodations, but rather the legislator was content to assume that communal accommodation results in the same cost savings for the residents of such accommodations as is the case in couple households. The balancing of interests and consequences to be carried out – in the context of preliminary legal protection – leads, in conjunction with the further explanations above, to giving greater weight to the interests of the applicant in that case and the plaintiff in this case in securing his minimum subsistence level while respecting the principle of human dignity than to the fiscal interests of the respondent in that case in avoiding potentially unjustified benefit payments, whereby the city of Kassel subsequently granted the correspondingly higher benefits not only provisionally, but also definitively, according to the case file.
The adjudicating chamber, even when composed of lay judges, continues to expressly adhere to all of this, whereby the application of both Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 No. 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) and Sections 3, 3a Paragraph 1 No. 2b, Paragraph 2 No. 2b of the AsylbLG, as interpreted by the defendant in conjunction with the Social Court of Landshut (as above) and the Higher Social Court of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (decisions of May 11, 2020, L 9 AY 22/19 B ER and of June 10, 2020, L 9 AY 22/19 B ER, juris), as well as the overwhelming majority of the aforementioned social court case law, would, in the chamber's opinion, be unconstitutional. However, the chamber is not prevented from adopting such a constitutionally compliant interpretation and is instead obligated to refer the legal dispute to the Federal Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 100 of the Basic Law (regarding the priority and admissibility of a For constitutionally compliant interpretation by the specialized courts in case constellations of the present kind, see Federal Constitutional Court, decision of October 1, 2020, 1 BvR 1106/20, juris and, moreover, Federal Constitutional Court, decisions of February 26, 2020, 1 BvL 1/20, juris, of February 12, 1992, 1 BvL 21/88 and of October 12, 2010, 2 BvL 59/06; furthermore, Hessian State Social Court, judgment of July 1, 2020, L 4 SO 120/18 –, juris).
The Social Court of Landshut (as above) further states in this regard:
"According to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of July 18, 2012 (BVerfG - 1 BvL 10/10 -, BVerfGE 132, 134-179), the amount of benefits must be determined in a transparent and appropriate procedure based on actual need, covering all essential living expenses. Differences in benefits between those entitled to benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) and those entitled to benefits under the Social Code, Books II and XII (SGB II and XII), are only justified if and to the extent that different needs of the two groups have been established and substantiated. The needs of the benefit recipients are decisive for both the assessment of needs and the provision of benefits. The legislature was entitled to assume that expenses are saved through shared finances and that, therefore, two partners living together have a minimum financial need that is less than twice that of a single person. Since, due to cohabitation, it can be assumed that both partners manage their finances 'from a common pool,' it is not objectionable that the legislature stipulated the same minimum need for partners." This approach is taken into account. An equal distribution of the reduced communal needs, unlike the household head principle previously practiced in social assistance law, complies with Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law (Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of February 9, 2010 – 1 BvL 1/09 –, BVerfGE 125, 175-260, para. 154, confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of July 23, 2014 – 1 BvL 10/12 –, BVerfGE 137, 34-103, para. 100).
According to the explanatory memorandum to the law, standard benefit level 2 only adopts the previous regulation for couples in the version of Section 8 of the Standard Benefit Remuneration Act (RBEG) valid until December 31, 2016, according to which both adults each receive 90% of the standard benefit rate. Couples include not only married couples and partners, but also cohabiting couples and registered civil partnerships (Gutzler in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGB XII, 2nd ed. 2014, Section 8 RBEG 1st revision, para. 15). This potential for savings arises from the fact that partners in shared households share living space, and therefore the housing costs per partner are significantly lower than in single-person households. The amount of the standard benefit level is determined by whether various household goods are jointly acquired and used, and whether consumables are purchased jointly. Against this background, it is appropriate to continue setting the standard benefit level 2 for partners living in the same residence at an amount corresponding to 90 percent of the standard benefit level. This is implemented through the provision in paragraph 1, number 2 for standard benefit level 2 for spouses, registered partners, and partners living in a marriage-like or civil partnership-like relationship. Due to the partnership-like nature of their cohabitation, it is generally assumed that these couples share household-related consumer expenditures (Bundestag printed matter 18/9984, pp. 85f).
The legislature did not conduct its own survey of the consumer spending of benefit recipients under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). It was stated that any specific consumption patterns of benefit recipients under the AsylbLG that deviate from those used as the basis for the income and expenditure survey are "not capable of being reliably determined and estimated" or "not plausibly substantiated" (draft bill, printed document 18/2592 of September 22, 2014, pp. 21ff). Accordingly, the legislature decided to calculate the needs of benefit recipients under Section 1 of the AsylbLG analogously to the needs of benefit recipients under the German Social Code, Book XII (SGB XII) or Book II (SGB II). This decision, in its implementation of the legal provisions, must be acknowledged.
It is clear that, according to the legislator's findings, the reduction of standard benefit rates to 90% compared to single individuals presupposes cohabitation, partnership, and shared finances. It appears impossible that unrelated persons in communal accommodation would regularly meet these three criteria without considering individual circumstances.
The composition and amount of necessary personal needs, and thus the cash allowance, are determined under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), as well as under the German Social Code, Book II (SGB II) and Book XII (SGB XII), based on the 2013 Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS 2013). In this survey, the legislature first defined what constitutes the socio-cultural subsistence minimum and then used a statistical model to determine household expenditures for these relevant consumer goods. According to this model, the standard allowances were calculated based on empirically determined consumer expenditures and the legislature's decisions regarding their relevance for guaranteeing a dignified subsistence minimum for the individual household constellations under consideration. The legislature stipulated that the standard allowances should be aligned with the consumption levels of other households with lower consumption levels.
The calculated consumption expenditures of the reference households for individual goods and services, which have been defined by the legislator as relevant to standard needs, each result in a total sum of the consumption expenditures required to guarantee the minimum subsistence level.
This sum represents the monthly payment amount. The recipients are responsible for deciding how to use this monthly amount.
The legislator's decision regarding which consumer expenditures are considered for calculating standard benefit rates is not intended to preempt individual decisions about how to use the monthly budget. Consequently, the calculation of standard benefit rates does not determine what benefit recipients will use the payment for or to what extent. Only the budget amount is determined according to the statistical model when calculating standard benefit rates.
The logic of the statistical model lies precisely in the fact that, in reality, the amounts allocated for each standard-benefit-relevant consumer expenditure are not exactly as calculated, but rather that actual consumer expenditure may deviate from these figures in individual cases. The only decisive factor is that the total budget is sufficient to cover consumer expenditure and guarantee a dignified minimum standard of living.
Inevitably, any additional expenditure compared to the average expenditures included in the calculation must be offset by reduced expenditures elsewhere. The individual composition of consumer spending varies from month to month due to differing developments and the unavoidable need to set priorities (for all of this, see draft bill, printed document 18/2592 of 22 September 2014, pp. 21ff; draft bill, printed document 17/3404 of 26 October 2010, p. 51).
The legislator therefore assumes that the decisive factor is not whether the individual items considered are specifically sufficient to cover the respective needs, but rather whether the total amount is sufficient to cover the socio-cultural minimum subsistence level. It has already been taken into account that not every person has all the individual consumption expenses considered in every month. It must therefore also be considered that fellow residents of the applicant's communal accommodation may have individual needs that they wish and are permitted to cover independently with the funds received. Furthermore, it is unclear what benefits the other residents of the applicant's communal accommodation actually receive. It is likely that some of the reduced basic benefits are subject to eligibility restrictions under Section 1a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). Additionally, it is unclear whether fellow residents are only entitled to benefits under Section 3 of the AsylbLG or according to standard benefit levels 3-6, or whether they also receive benefits in kind or income
There is a lack of empirical studies demonstrating that living together in communal accommodation alone results in shared economic activity that produces the savings and synergy effects proven in couple households (cf. Social Court Landshut, decision of October 24, 2019 – S 11 AY 64/19 ER –; Higher Social Court Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, decision of June 10, 2020 – L 9 AY 22/19 B ER –; Social Court Freiburg (Breisgau), decision of December 3, 2019 – S 9 AY 4605/19 ER –; Social Court Hannover, decision of December 20, 2019 – S 53 AY 107/19 –; Higher Social Court of Saxony, decision of March 23, 2020 – L 8 AY 4/20 B ER –; Social Court Frankfurt a. M., decision of 14.01.2020 – S 30 AY 26/19 ER -; SG Freiburg (Breisgau), decision of 20 January 2020 – S 7 AY 5235/19 ER -; SG Munich, decision of 10 February 2020 – S 42 AY 82/19 ER -; SG Berlin, decision of 19 May 2020 – S 90 AY 57/20 ER -).
It may be plausible that "family members living together in a household" are in such a "close relationship" to one another that they generally manage their finances "from a common pool" (cf. BVerfGE 75, 382 <394>; 87, 234 <256>; BVerfG, decision of July 27, 2016 – 1 BvR 371/11 –, BVerfGE 142, 353-388, para. 53). Without such a close relationship, a general joint management of finances is not sufficiently plausible. The Federal Government also proceeds on this basis: According to the explanatory memorandum to the Act on the Determination of Standard Needs and on the Amendment of the Second and Twelfth Books of the Social Code, a reduced need is indeed presumed for adults who do not live alone due to their cohabitation with others. However, they are still assigned the standard allowance for single persons, "because the reduced allowance cannot be sufficiently quantified for all conceivable scenarios." An exception to this is made for couples whose cohabitation is characterized by shared finances, for which household savings must be assumed even in the general assessment (BT-Drs. 18/9984).
Even when living together in communal accommodations, a general reduction in need cannot be sufficiently quantified. A close relationship comparable to that between couples is not inherently present. Unlike people living together in a partnership or adult children living with their parents, benefit recipients living in communal accommodations have not voluntarily chosen to live with other people. Benefit recipients are assigned to a specific communal accommodation by the responsible authority and, if necessary, within that accommodation (by the operator), to a specific residential unit.
The allocation is at the discretion of the authority or operator. Ideally, it is based on countries or regions of origin, but there is no entitlement to this. It is not certain, and rather unlikely, that individuals who are required by the responsible authority or the operator of a communal accommodation facility to share certain premises will generally develop a close relationship that allows for shared financial resources (Saxony State Social Court, decision of March 23, 2020 – L 8 AY 4/20 B ER –; Munich Social Court, decision of February 10, 2020 – S 42 AY 82/19 ER –).
Such a close relationship does not arise simply from the fact that the individuals concerned "find themselves in the same life situation in the asylum procedure, regardless of their origin," and "essentially form a community of fate," as stated in the explanatory memorandum to the law (BT-Drs. 19/10052, p. 24). The general assumption that persons living in collective accommodations are in the same life situation is incorrect (cf. Social Court Frankfurt, decision of January 14, 2020 – S 30 AY 26/19 ER –; Social Court Hanover, decision of December 20, 2019 – S 53 AY 107/19 –; Higher Social Court Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, decision of June 10, 2020 – L 9 AY 22/19 B ER –). Communal accommodations house individuals with varying residency statuses, different prospects of remaining in Germany (depending, among other things, on their individual history of persecution, country of origin, education, etc.), and different social welfare situations (e.g., recipients of analogous benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act, basic benefits under Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act, or those affected by benefit restrictions under Section 1a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act). It is not apparent why strangers who happen to be in the same accommodation should always be expected to share expenses (cf. Social Court of Hanover, decision of December 20, 2019 – S 53 AY 107/19 –; Higher Social Court of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, decision of June 10, 2020 – L 9 AY 22/19 B ER –). The application of standard benefit level 2 cannot be justified simply by arguing that it is "possible and reasonable" for benefit recipients to achieve the "described savings" and that "shared expenses" are "expected" of them. This "obligation," assumed by the legislature, to make all reasonable efforts to get along with one another in communal accommodation, does not, in any case, take into account the actual need for accommodation. It is not the possibility of meeting needs, but rather the actual meeting of needs that cannot be disregarded in the case of individuals housed in communal accommodation through a value judgment. The fact that placement in communal accommodation, unlike in ordinary shared apartments, is not voluntary, argues against generally expecting those affected to manage their finances collectively.
Furthermore, the non-recognition of individual needs, which is solely based on an obligation to share resources, cannot be tenably justified because it is impossible for the individual to fulfill this obligation on their own. Rather, they are dependent on the cooperation of the other people living in the communal accommodation to actually achieve the cost savings, without having a legal right to demand such cooperation from them. In this respect, too, there is a difference compared to people living in a partnership. The latter at least have the option of leaving the communal accommodation and thereby triggering the application of the RBS 1 (Standard Benefits Act 1). Those receiving benefits who are involuntarily housed in communal accommodation do not have this option.
Section 2, paragraph 1, sentence 4, number 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in the version of August 15, 2019, can be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitution to mean that those entitled to benefits actually share a household with at least one other person. The fundamental presumption of the constitutionality of a law implies the requirement that, in cases of doubt, a law be interpreted in a manner consistent with the constitution. Respect for the legislative branch demands that the will of the legislature be taken into account as far as possible within the bounds of what is constitutionally permissible. If, considering the wording, legislative history, systematic interpretation, and purpose of a statutory provision, different interpretations are possible, one of which would have to be rejected as unconstitutional, while at least one leads to a constitutionally compliant result, then it is not appropriate to declare the provision incompatible with the constitution.
The limits of constitutionally compliant interpretation arise from recognized methods of interpretation. An understanding of a legal norm that contradicts the clearly expressed will of the legislature cannot be justified even by means of a constitutionally compliant interpretation (BVerfGE 130, 372 <397 ff.>; see also BVerfGE 83, 201 <214 f.>; 86, 288 <320>; 122, 39 <60 f.>). A constitutionally compliant interpretation is also precluded if the provision lacks a sufficiently specific regulatory content intended by the legislature (see BVerfGE 107, 104 <128>).
Based on these principles, a constitutionally compliant interpretation of Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 Number 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is both possible and required. The provision should therefore be understood to mean that actual economic cooperation takes place.
The wording of Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 Number 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) does not preclude such an interpretation, as the provision contains no conflicting regulation and refers to the German Social Code, Book XII (SGB XII). The legislative history and purpose of Section 2 AsylbLG do not reveal any contrary legislative intent. In particular, the explanatory memorandum to the law repeatedly and explicitly refers to actual shared economic activity (Bundestag Printed Matter 19/10052, pp. 23 et seq.). The very aim of the provision is to include any potential financial advantages of cohabiting persons. This aim is achieved by the interpretation adopted here. The constitutionally compliant interpretation adopted helps to avoid undue hardship in cases where those affected do not actually derive any economic advantages from cohabitation. Sufficient cases for the application of the regulation also remain
The adjudicating chamber adopts all of the above-mentioned statements by the chamber and the plaintiff after its own examination.
The Chamber is also convinced that the above statements are compatible with the fundamental right to a dignified minimum standard of living under Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. This compatibility can only be achieved, if at all, through a constitutionally compliant interpretation of Section 3a Paragraph 1 Number 2b of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), Section 3a Paragraph 2 Number 2b of the AsylbLG, or Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 4 Number 1 of the AsylbLG. Such an interpretation would require that the application of benefit level 2 or 2b, as an unwritten criterion, presupposes the actual and verifiable joint household management of the benefit recipient with other persons housed in the collective accommodation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine on a case-by-case basis whether there is an "actual and verifiable financial participation in the (joint) household management," i.e., whether the benefit recipient lives and manages finances with others (e.g., joint shopping and meal preparation) and thereby incurs lower costs. Needs exist for things like food, but also for leisure, entertainment and culture, whereby doubts are resolved against the benefit provider under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) as the bearer of the objective burden of proof. (See also Frerichs in jurisPK-SGB XII, § 3a AsylbLG, paras. 40ff).
At the same time, the court is convinced by the personal statement submitted by the plaintiff that the plaintiff does not engage in legally relevant joint financial management, and that the corresponding presumption of the legislature is therefore refuted. Actions not aimed at the aforementioned purpose, as well as occasional and not continuous joint cooking, are insufficient for this purpose. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff is managing their finances from a single source and thereby achieving actual cost savings, as is the case in families, cohabiting couples, civil partnerships, shared households, or similar arrangements.
This was not the case during the first three weeks of October 2019, and certainly not subsequently from October 21, 2019, until the plaintiff was assigned to the city of Kassel, since the plaintiff had been continuously in inpatient hospital treatment since October 21, 2019, and then seamlessly in inpatient rehabilitation treatment, meaning that, due to illness, he had led a life ultimately controlled by others, at least during this period – as the aforementioned medical records show.
The complaint was therefore to be granted.
The decision on costs follows § 193 SGG.
Because of the fundamental importance of the matter, the Chamber expressly admitted the appeal, which would otherwise be inadmissible due to the amount of the appeal value.
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