Administrative Court Kassel – Decision of 02.02.2021 – File No.: 4 L 177/21.KS

DECISION

In the administrative litigation

Mr. xxx's

applicant,

Authorized representative:
Attorney Sven Adam,
Lange Geismarstraße 55, 37073 Göttingen, – 0056/21 –

against

the Werra-Meißner district, represented by the district committee,
Bremer Straße 10 a, 37269 Eschwege,

Respondent,

because of immigration law

The Kassel Administrative Court – 4th Chamber – has ruled

Judge at the Administrative Court xxx as presiding judge,
Judge at the Administrative Court xxx,
Judge Dr. xxx

Decided on February 2, 2021:

It is determined that the applicant's action of February 1, 2021, against the respondent's decision of January 8, 2021 (file no. 4 K 178121.KS) has suspensive effect. The application is otherwise dismissed.

The respondent shall bear the costs of the proceedings.

The amount in dispute is set at EUR 2,500.00.

The applicant is granted legal aid for the first instance without any obligation to make installment payments, and attorney Sven Adam, Lange Geismarstr. 55, 37073 Göttingen, is appointed to represent him. The granting of legal aid is subject to the condition that costs which would not have been incurred had an attorney established within the district of the Administrative Court been appointed are not to be reimbursed (§ 166 para. 1 sentence 1 VwGO in conjunction with § 121 para. 3 ZPO).

REASONS

The application to order the suspensive effect of the applicant's action against the respondent's decision of January 8, 2021, is inadmissible, although in the present case, pursuant to Section 16a Paragraph 1 of the Hessian Administrative Procedure Act (HessAGVwGO) in conjunction with Item 2.6 of the Annex to Section 16a HessAGVwGO, preliminary proceedings under Section 68 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO) are not required, and the action brought is therefore the appropriate legal remedy. However, the application to order the suspensive effect of this action is futile, and the applicant lacks the necessary legal interest because the action has suspensive effect pursuant to Section 80 Paragraph 1 VwGO. This effect is not waived under Section 80 Paragraph 2 Sentence 1 Number 3 VwGO in conjunction with Section 2 Paragraph 5 of the Hessian State Reception Act (LAG). Rather, only an action against the allocation order does not have suspensive effect, whereas not every action concerning legal proceedings before the Hessian Regional Labor Court (Hess. LAG) does. However, since the present dispute does not concern an allocation decision but a transfer to different accommodation, the action therefore has suspensive effect in the absence of a deviating statutory provision, because the respondent has not ordered immediate enforcement.

The court, however, interprets the application to order the suspensive effect of the applicant's action pursuant to Section 80 Paragraph 5 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO), taking into account the expressed desire for legal protection pursuant to Section 122 Paragraph 1 and Section 88 VwGO, as containing, as a lesser form of application, the request to establish, by analogy with Section 80 Paragraph 5 Sentence 1 VwGO, that the action has suspensive effect. The application, thus understood, is successful.

Its admissibility derives from the fact that Article 19 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 of the Basic Law mandates that, in the event of imminent de facto enforcement despite the filing of a lawsuit, preliminary legal protection analogous to Section 80 Paragraph 5 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act must be granted. Such legal protection is necessary if an authority, despite the suspensive effect of a legal remedy, threatens to enforce the contested administrative act, commences its enforcement, or continues enforcement already begun.

This is the situation here. It is to be feared that the respondent will enforce his order of January 8, 2021, regardless of the lawsuit filed against him. He apparently assumes that this order is immediately enforceable, and the applicant must expect enforcement measures to be taken shortly. The deadline set for him to vacate his current accommodation expired on February 1, 2021, i.e., yesterday, and the respondent has announced that he will carry out a forced eviction if the applicant fails to comply. Furthermore, in his response to the open letter from the residents of the disputed communal accommodation, he stated that the tenancy for this property will end on March 31, 2021. This short timeframe indicates that there is reason to believe the respondent will take enforcement measures before a decision has been reached on the lawsuit against his order of January 8, 2021.

Even though there is no reason to do so in these proceedings, in light of the existing time pressure and to avoid further expedited proceedings, the following is pointed out as a precaution regarding the legality of the contested order of the respondent:

Insofar as, pursuant to Section 3 Paragraph 2 of the Hessian State Law on the Accommodation of Persons (Hess. LAG), persons to be admitted and accommodated by the districts and municipalities under Section 1 of the Hessian State Law on the Accommodation of Persons (Hess. LAG) have no right to accommodation in a specific location, and the locally responsible district committee or municipal council can order accommodation in a different location or a transfer within the same location, the court is convinced that the latter is not merely a regulation of the permissibility of accommodating the person concerned elsewhere, but rather a power for the exercise of which administrative discretion must be exercised. The reference to Section 3 Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Hessian State Law on the Accommodation of Persons (Hess. LAG) is therefore not applicable. A decision based on the Regional Labor Court (LAG) is therefore subject to judicial review pursuant to Section 114 Sentence 1 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGO) (only) as to whether, firstly, the factual prerequisites are met and the authority has recognized that it has been granted discretion (i.e., there is no failure to exercise discretion), secondly, whether the authority has exercised its discretion in a manner consistent with the purpose of the authorization (i.e., there is no abuse of discretion), and thirdly, whether the legal limits of discretion have been observed (i.e., there is no exceeding of discretion).

Insofar as the implementation decision requires justification, given the extensive organizational freedom of municipalities, it suffices that the general justification requirements of Section 39 Paragraph 1 of the Hessian Administrative Procedure Act (Hess. VwVfG) are met, according to which the guiding principles for the discretionary decision must be set down in writing. While these considerations can be supplemented in administrative court proceedings pursuant to Section 114 Sentence 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO), they cannot be added retroactively and thus cannot be exercised for the first time.

Based on these standards, the respondent must accept that its decision contains no explanation whatsoever regarding its discretionary considerations. The circumstances relevant to the selection of the new accommodation are not explained. Due to this deficient reasoning, the contested order does not meet the requirements for a discretionary decision under Section 39 Paragraph 1 of the Hessian Administrative Procedure Act (Hess. VwVfG). In this respect, it should be noted as a precaution that this deficiency in reasoning can only be remedied (Section 45 Paragraph 1 No. 2, Section 114 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO)) if it is sufficiently clear from the administrative file that it is in fact only a deficiency in reasoning and not a significant failure to exercise discretion. Since the fact that the communal accommodation is being closed is relevant with regard to the provisions of Section 3 Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Hessian Administrative Procedure Act (Hess. VwVfG), this does not constitute a significant failure to exercise discretion. Since the LAG (Local Administrative Court) leaves no room for discretion in individual case decisions, no further explanation regarding the discretion to decide on the matter is likely necessary. However, this does not apply to the discretion regarding the choice of accommodation, i.e., the question of which other accommodation the transfer should take place to. A decision free from errors of discretion requires that the person affected be heard and given the opportunity to present their interests. These interests must then be considered according to their weight and weighed against the options available to the municipality.

The decision on costs is based on Section 155 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGO).

The application for legal aid is to be granted because, according to his personal and economic circumstances, the applicant cannot raise the costs of the litigation even in installments, and the legal action sought offers sufficient prospects of success for the aforementioned reasons and does not appear frivolous (§ 114 ZPO in conjunction with § 166 VwGO).

The value in dispute is set at EUR 2,500.00 pursuant to Sections 53 Paragraph 2 and 52 Paragraph 2 of the Court Costs Act (GKG). In the absence of sufficient factual indications for assessing the economic significance of the matter for the applicant in the main proceedings, the court has applied the default value in dispute of EUR 5,000.00 and halved this amount for the preliminary injunction proceedings in view of the provisional nature of the legal protection sought here.

The following is information on legal remedies.