DECISION
In the legal dispute
xxx,
Plaintiff,
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam
, Lange-Geismar-Straße 55, 37073 Göttingen
against
State of Hesse,
represented by the Darmstadt Regional Council,
Luisenplatz 2, 64283 Darmstadt,
Defendant,
The 16th Chamber of the Social Court of Darmstadt decided on December 19, 2024, through the presiding judge, Judge xxx of the Social Court:
The defendant must reimburse the plaintiff for the necessary extrajudicial costs incurred.
REASONS
Pursuant to Section 193 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Social Courts Act (SGG), the court decides by order, upon application, whether and to what extent the parties must reimburse each other's costs if the proceedings are terminated other than by judgment. In the present case, the proceedings were terminated by a declaration from the plaintiff's legal representative dated November 11, 2021, and a corresponding application for costs was filed.
The decision on costs is made at the court's discretion, taking into account the current state of the case and the facts of the case (legal principle of Section 91a of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Section 161 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO)). In principle, the costs of the proceedings are to be borne by the losing party. However, the prospects of success and the actual outcome of the proceedings are not the sole criteria for the cost decision. Rather, the court must consider all circumstances of the individual case in addition to the outcome of the litigation. One possible aspect in this regard is the so-called causation principle. The basis for applying the so-called "causation principle" as a discretionary consideration is the notion that the costs of the court proceedings should be imposed on the party who gave rise to the legal dispute (see HLSG, Decision of January 30, 1996, Case No. L 4 B 24/95, juris para. 8; Decision of May 13, 1996, Case No. L 5 B 64/94, juris para. 23; Leitherer in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Leitherer, SGG, 11th edition 2014, § 193, para. 12b). It is therefore necessary to examine whether the proceedings were avoidable or superfluous from the outset and, if so, who is responsible for this. In this respect, it is particularly important whether, in the course of the administrative procedure, the benefit provider has sufficiently complied with its duty to investigate the matter and the beneficiary has sufficiently complied with its duty to cooperate.
If, upon the undisputed conclusion of the legal dispute, it remains unclear whether the benefit provider gave cause for the legal dispute, but the benefit recipient ultimately prevails with their original claim, albeit to a lesser extent, it is generally equitable, in consideration of the principles of success and causation, to apportion costs (see in particular HLSG, decision of 07.02.2003, file no. L 12 B 93/02 RJ, juris-Rn. 18; Leitherer in: ibid., § 193 Rn. 12 ff.).
Taking these principles into account, the court, exercising its discretion, considers it appropriate for the defendant to bear the costs.
The subject of the proceedings brought before the court on November 1, 2021, was the plaintiff's claim for a decision on her objection of July 2, 2021, against the defendant's decision of June 22, 2021. The action for failure to act became moot after the defendant took action.
An action for failure to act is admissible pursuant to Section 88 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Social Courts Act (SGG) if (1) an application for an administrative act has been submitted, (2) no decision has yet been made on this application, and (3) three months have elapsed since the objection was filed (so-called waiting period). If there is sufficient reason why the requested administrative act has not yet been issued, the court shall suspend the proceedings until the expiry of a period set by it, which may be extended (Sentence 2).
The requirements of sentence 1 were met in this case. There was no sufficient reason for a different handling of the matter. The fact that the statutory three-month period expired between the initial authority's forwarding of the case to the competent appeals body cannot be considered a sufficient reason within the meaning of the aforementioned provision. This is merely an internal administrative procedure that does not justify a different assessment due to the specific circumstances of this case. Rather, this is the standard case, according to which the defendant is obligated to ensure a decision within the legally stipulated three-month period.
It is not apparent why compliance with the blocking period should not have been possible. The defendant must bear the responsibility for this delay, so the imposition of costs is justified in this case.
The appeal against this decision is excluded pursuant to Section 172 Paragraph 3 of the Social Courts Act (SGG).
