DECISION
In the legal dispute
xxx,
Plaintiff,
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam
, Lange-Geismar-Straße 55, 37073 Göttingen
against
Darmstadt-Dieburg district,
represented by the district council,
legal department,
Jägertorstraße 207, 64289 Darmstadt,
Defendant,
The 16th Chamber of the Social Court of Darmstadt decided on January 27, 2025, through the presiding judge, Judge xxx of the Social Court:
The defendant must reimburse the plaintiff for the necessary extrajudicial costs incurred.
REASONS
Pursuant to Section 193 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Social Courts Act (SGG), the court decides by order, upon application, whether and to what extent the parties must reimburse each other's costs if the proceedings are terminated other than by judgment. In the present case, the proceedings were terminated by a declaration from the plaintiff's attorney dated October 16, 2024, and a corresponding application for costs was filed.
The decision on costs is made at the court's discretion, taking into account the current state of the case and the facts of the case (legal principle of Section 91a of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Section 161 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO)). In principle, the costs of the proceedings are to be borne by the losing party. However, the prospects of success and the actual outcome of the proceedings are not the sole criteria for the cost decision. Rather, the court must consider all circumstances of the individual case in addition to the outcome of the litigation. One possible aspect in this regard is the so-called causation principle. The basis for applying the so-called "causation principle" as a discretionary consideration is the notion that the costs of the court proceedings should be imposed on the party who gave rise to the legal dispute (see HLSG, Decision of January 30, 1996, Case No. L 4 B 24/95, juris para. 8; Decision of May 13, 1996, Case No. L 5 B 64/94, juris para. 23; Leitherer in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Leitherer, SGG, 11th edition 2014, § 193, para. 12b). It is therefore necessary to examine whether the proceedings were avoidable or superfluous from the outset and, if so, who is responsible for this. In this respect, it is particularly important whether, in the course of the administrative procedure, the benefit provider has sufficiently complied with its duty to investigate the matter and the beneficiary has sufficiently complied with its duty to cooperate.
If, upon the undisputed conclusion of the legal dispute, it remains unclear whether the benefit provider gave cause for the legal dispute, but the benefit recipient ultimately prevails with their original claim, albeit to a lesser extent, it is generally equitable, in consideration of the principles of success and causation, to apportion costs (see in particular HLSG, decision of 07.02.2003, file no. L 12 B 93/02 RJ, juris-Rn. 18; Leitherer in: ibid., § 193 Rn. 12 ff.).
Taking these principles into account, the court, exercising its discretion, considers it appropriate for the defendant to bear the costs.
The subject of the proceedings initiated before the court on April 10, 2024, was the plaintiff's claim for a decision on her application pursuant to Section 44 of the German Social Code, Book X (SGB X), dated May 30, 2023, regarding the defendant's decision of November 30, 2022. The application was substantiated in a written submission dated September 6, 2023. By letter dated February 23, 2024, the defendant proposed a stay of proceedings, assuring the court that a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court would be followed. The plaintiff's legal representative rejected the stay in a letter dated March 4, 2024. In a letter dated May 15, 2024, the defendant again assured the plaintiff that a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court would be followed and further assured that any back payments would accrue interest. The action for failure to act was withdrawn by letter dated October 16, 2024.
An action for failure to act is admissible pursuant to Section 88 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Social Courts Act (SGG) if (1) an application for an administrative act has been submitted, (2) no decision has yet been made on this application, and (3) three months have elapsed since the objection was filed (so-called waiting period). If there is sufficient reason why the requested administrative act has not yet been issued, the court shall suspend the proceedings until the expiry of a period set by it, which may be extended (Sentence 2).
The conditions of sentence 1 were met in this case. There was also no sufficient reason for a different treatment of the matter according to sentence 2.
In principle, a sufficient reason for inaction can be based on the conduct of an objector if a temporary, exceptional burden arises at the addressee authority due to a large number of applications and objections from the same plaintiff (BeckOGK/Diehm, November 1, 2024, SGG § 88 para. 60, beck-online). Referring to the aforementioned decision of the Hessian State Social Court of July 15, 2008, file number L 9 B 39/08 SO, no such burden exists in the present case. It must be taken into account that although the plaintiff pursued several proceedings, they were thematically identical in legal content. The defendant had already addressed the issue and informed the plaintiff before the action for failure to act that the objection would currently have to be rejected, but offered a stay of proceedings. It is therefore not apparent that the defendant was unable to issue a decision within the statutory time limit due to the applications and objections.
The defendant's argument that it would have sufficed to file the action for failure to act in the parallel proceedings does not lead to a different decision. Since the proceedings concern different subject matters, the plaintiff is entitled to file an action for failure to act in each of the proceedings.
It is not apparent why compliance with the waiting period should not have been possible. The defendant must bear the responsibility for this delay, so the imposition of costs is justified in this case. An appeal against this decision is inadmissible, § 172 para. 3 of the Social Courts Act (SGG).
