DECISION
In the legal dispute
1. xxx,
Plaintiff,
2. xxx,
Plaintiff,
Legal representative: for 1-2:
Attorney Sven Adam
, Lange-Geismar-Straße 55, 37073 Göttingen,
against
State of Hesse,
represented by the Darmstadt Regional Council,
Luisenplatz 2, 64283 Darmstadt,
Defendant,
The 16th Chamber of the Social Court of Darmstadt decided on January 30, 2025, through its presiding judge, Judge xxx of the Social Court:
The defendant must reimburse the plaintiff for the necessary extrajudicial costs incurred.
REASONS
Pursuant to Section 193 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Social Courts Act (SGG), the court decides by order, upon application, whether and to what extent the parties must reimburse each other's costs if the proceedings are terminated other than by judgment. In the present case, the proceedings were terminated by a declaration from the plaintiffs' legal representative dated November 1, 2023, and a corresponding application for costs was filed.
The decision on costs is made at the court's discretion, taking into account the current state of the case and the facts of the case (legal principle of Section 91a of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Section 161 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO)). In principle, the costs of the proceedings are to be borne by the losing party. However, the prospects of success and the actual outcome of the proceedings are not the sole criteria for the cost decision. Rather, the court must consider all circumstances of the individual case in addition to the outcome of the litigation. One possible aspect in this regard is the so-called causation principle. The basis for applying the so-called "causation principle" as a discretionary consideration is the notion that the costs of the court proceedings should be imposed on the party who gave rise to the legal dispute (see HLSG, Decision of January 30, 1996, Case No. L 4 B 24/95, juris para. 8; Decision of May 13, 1996, Case No. L 5 B 64/94, juris para. 23; Leitherer in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Leitherer, SGG, 11th edition 2014, § 193, para. 12b). It is therefore necessary to examine whether the proceedings were avoidable or superfluous from the outset and, if so, who is responsible for this. In this respect, it is particularly important whether, in the course of the administrative procedure, the benefit provider has sufficiently complied with its duty to investigate the matter and the beneficiary has sufficiently complied with its duty to cooperate.
If, upon the undisputed conclusion of the legal dispute, it remains unclear whether the benefit provider gave cause for the legal dispute, but the benefit recipient ultimately prevails with their original claim, albeit to a lesser extent, it is generally equitable, in consideration of the principles of success and causation, to apportion costs (see in particular HLSG, decision of 07.02.2003, file no. L 12 B 93/02 RJ, juris-Rn. 18; Leitherer in: ibid., § 193 Rn. 12 ff.).
Taking these principles into account, the court, exercising its discretion, considers it appropriate for the defendant to bear the costs.
The subject of the proceedings filed with the court on April 30, 2023, was the plaintiffs' claim for a decision on their objection of January 17, 2023, against the defendant's decision of January 9, 2023. By letter dated February 8, 2023, the plaintiffs' legal representative was informed that the objection had been forwarded to the appeals authority. The objection was decided by a decision dated September 15, 2023. The defendant argued that the action for failure to act could have been avoided if an inquiry into the status of the case had been made first. On November 12, 2023, the action was withdrawn by letter dated November 1, 2023.
In a letter dated February 26, 2024, the defendant stated that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine and the high influx of refugees, the administration had been under temporary and exceptional strain, which had led to delays in processing appeals. The defendant explained that, without increasing staff, it had to manage the numerous challenges of serving as the state distribution center for all of Hesse, handling daily allocations to relieve the burden on the EAEH (Emergency Aid Unit) as well as direct reports from local authorities. One case worker was responsible for processing appeals related to the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the entire administrative district. Due to the many other tasks within Department II 25 resulting from the high number of refugees, a reallocation of personnel was not possible. Therefore, there was a sufficient reason for the delayed processing.
The plaintiffs' legal representative referred to the decision of the Speyer Social Court of 28 July 2023 under file number S 15 AY 1/23.
In his written submission of December 6, 2024, the defendant further argued that the special circumstances of this particular case lay in the fact that the plaintiff's representative must have been aware of this situation and its impact on the processing of appeals under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act. Since he represented various individuals in numerous proceedings before the defendant, he must also have been aware that there was only one case worker responsible for this area within the administrative district and that timely processing of tasks had become virtually impossible. He should therefore also have been aware that the responsible case worker was making organizational efforts to at least check, upon request from an appellant, whether priority processing was possible. Given the large number of cases handled by the plaintiff's representative, it seemed reasonable to submit a brief status inquiry before filing an action for failure to act.
An action for failure to act is admissible pursuant to Section 88 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Social Courts Act (SGG) if (1) an application for an administrative act has been submitted, (2) no decision has yet been made on this application, and (3) three months have elapsed since the objection was filed (so-called waiting period). If there is sufficient reason why the requested administrative act has not yet been issued, the court shall suspend the proceedings until the expiry of a period set by it, which may be extended (Sentence 2).
The requirements of sentence 1 were met in this case. There was also no sufficient reason for a different handling of the case pursuant to sentence 2. While short-term staffing shortages due to temporary overtime following legislative changes or a reorganization of responsibilities can constitute sufficient grounds, this is not evident from the defendant's submissions. Delays due to persistent organizational deficiencies do not constitute sufficient grounds, as these are circumstances that are not in accordance with the legal system and must not be to the detriment of the appellant. The administration is generally obligated to organize its business processes with the allocated personnel resources in such a way that the legal requirements – and thus also the statutory standard processing time of Section 88 – are met (BeckOGK/Diehm, November 1, 2024, SGG § 88 Rn. 55-58, beck-online). It must be taken into account that the defendant is aware of the overload of the sole case worker due to an increased number of appeal proceedings. The alleged war in Ukraine began in February 2022 and can hardly be considered a short-term circumstance after only a year. However, the defendant's lack of options for personnel redeployment cannot affect the plaintiffs' legal rights. In particular, no further "unwritten" requirement exists that the applicant or appellant must first submit a status inquiry before filing an action for failure to act. It should also be noted that the plaintiffs' legal representative was notified of the referral to the competent appeals authority by letter dated February 8, 2023. This clearly indicated that the appeal was considered ready for a decision.
It is not apparent why compliance with the blocking period should not have been possible. The defendant must bear the responsibility for this delay, so the imposition of costs is justified in this case.
The appeal against this decision is excluded, § 172 para. 3 Social Courts Act (SGG).
