DECISION
In the legal dispute
xxx,
– Applicant –
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam,
Lange Geismarstraße 55,
37073 Göttingen
against
State of Rhineland-Palatinate,
represented by the Supervisory and Service Directorate,
Willy-Brandt-Platz 3, 54290 Trier
– Respondent –
The 15th Chamber of the Speyer Social Court ruled on June 20, 2025, through the
Judge at the Social Court xxx
decided:
1. The respondent is ordered by way of an interim injunction to provide the applicant with provisionally unrestricted benefits pursuant to Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the period from June 1, 2025 to November 30, 2025, but at the latest until the finality of a decision on the applicant's objection of May 26, 2025 or until the applicant leaves the federal territory.
2. The respondent shall reimburse the applicant for her necessary extrajudicial costs.
3. The applicant is granted legal aid without installment payments and lawyer Sven Adam is appointed to represent her from the date of application.
REASONS
The application seeking to compel the respondent to grant benefits pursuant to Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is admissible and well-founded.
1. According to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Social Courts Act (SGG), preliminary injunctions to regulate a provisional state of affairs with regard to a disputed legal relationship are permissible if such regulation appears necessary to avert substantial disadvantages. The application is admissible in particular because the main legal dispute is not a purely contestable matter. The applicant seeks the granting of higher benefits.
A prerequisite for issuing a preliminary injunction is the existence of both a claim to the injunction (i.e., a legally valid entitlement to the provisionally sought benefit) and grounds for the injunction (in the sense of the urgency of a preliminary ruling). Both the grounds for the injunction and the claim to the injunction must be substantiated (§ 86b para. 2 sentence 4 of the Social Court Act (SGG) in conjunction with § 920 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO)). Due to the provisional nature of a preliminary injunction, it should generally not prejudge a final decision on the merits. In its decision, the court may both weigh the consequences and conduct a summary review of the prospects of success on the merits. However, if, without granting preliminary legal protection, serious and unreasonable impairments are imminent that cannot be averted otherwise and that could no longer be remedied by the main proceedings, then the courts may only consider the prospects of success once the factual and legal situation has been conclusively clarified. If, however, the court is unable to fully clarify the facts and the legal situation in expedited proceedings, the decision must be based solely on a balancing of interests (Federal Constitutional Court, decision of May 12, 2005 – 1 BvR 596/05 – all decisions cited according to Juris). If – as in this case – the benefits in question are those under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), which serve to ensure a life of human dignity and thus secure the minimum subsistence level, the paramount importance of these benefits for the recipient must be taken into account, with the consequence that, in cases of doubt, the benefits must be granted provisionally for constitutional reasons.
2. The applicant has demonstrated a plausible claim to an injunction. The applicant's objection has a high probability of success on the merits. The cessation of regular benefits under Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is, in all likelihood, unlawful and violates the applicant's rights. She is, in fact, likely entitled to these benefits.
2.1 Based on the current state of facts and legal arguments, the legal requirements for a restriction of entitlement pursuant to Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 No. 2 AsylbLG in the version applicable since 31 October 2024 may indeed be met.
2.2 The applicant's objection has a high probability of success because, according to the legal opinion of, among others, the adjudicating chamber, the exclusion of entitlement under Section 1 Paragraph 4 No. 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) violates the fundamental right to a dignified minimum standard of living under Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 GG (see, in particular, the Federal Constitutional Court's judgments of February 9, 2010 – 1 BvL 1/09, 1 BvL 3/09, 1 BvL 4/09 – and of July 18, 2012 (1 BvL 10/10, 1 BvL 2/11 –; all decisions cited according to juris). The unconstitutionality of the provision would, in main proceedings, lead the court to seek a ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) pursuant to Article 100 Paragraph 1 GG. would have to.
The Federal Constitutional Court's (BVerfG) exclusive power to declare laws unconstitutional means that a court may only draw conclusions from its finding of unconstitutionality in the main proceedings after the BVerfG has made such a determination. However, Article 100 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law does not prevent lower courts from granting preliminary legal protection based on their own legal opinion even before the BVerfG's decision in the main proceedings, if this appears necessary in the interest of effective legal protection under the circumstances of the case and does not prejudge the main decision (BVerfG, Decision of June 24, 1992 – 1 BvR 1028/91 –, para. 29).
Procedural law necessitates considering the unconstitutionality of a legal provision when (preliminarily) examining the existence of a legal basis for an adverse administrative act under Section 86b Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 No. 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG). If the legal basis is unconstitutional, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) would have to challenge it in a specific judicial review proceeding under Article 100 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG)
The main proceedings should be declared void. The invalidity of the enabling provision would obviously render any administrative act based thereon unlawful.
2.3 The fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living that ensures human dignity (for the dogmatic derivation and further specification, see the referral decision of the Social Court of Mainz of April 18, 2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 – regarding Section 7 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 No. 2 of the German Social Code, Book II, old version) has only three prerequisites: Firstly, the holder of the fundamental right must be a human being, i.e., a natural person. This applies without exception to all people, regardless of their origin or nationality (see Kirchhof, NZS 2015, p. 4). Secondly, those entitled to benefits are all persons who are actually residing in Germany (see Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 18 July 2012 – 1 BvL 10/10, 1 BvL 2/11 – para. 63; Kirchhof, NZS 2015, p. 4; Kempny/Krüger, SGb 2013, p. 386; see also Neumann, NVwZ 1995, p. 428, regarding the territoriality principle). Thirdly, the person concerned must actually be in need of assistance (Social Court Mainz, referral order of 18 April 2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, paras. 284 ff.).
The legislature must define, through a formal law, the minimum requirements for guaranteeing a dignified minimum standard of living (i.e., what is essential for survival). This is because the legislature's freedom to shape policy, derived from the principle of democracy, means that the legislature is responsible, firstly, for the fundamental value judgments regarding the needs necessary for securing subsistence, and secondly, for realizing a concrete entitlement to subsistence-level benefits for every holder of a fundamental right in need. Since only the legislature can implement this task, it is also obligated to do so – otherwise, the fundamental right could not be realized (Social Court Mainz, referral decision of April 18, 2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, para. 295 et seq.).
The specific entitlement to benefits of the person entitled to assistance must in turn be established in a formal law on the basis of a constitutionally compliant legislative procedure (formal statutory entitlement; cf. Social Court Mainz, referral decision of 18 April 2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, para. 312 et seq.)
The entitlement to benefits must be sufficiently defined by the legal text itself to allow the administration to make a decision regarding the amount of the benefit that comprehensibly takes into account the value judgments of the legislator expressed in the legal text (sufficient specificity; concrete entitlement). This precludes both the use of overly vague legal terms (cf. already Social Court Mainz, referral decision of December 12, 2014 – S 3 AS 130/14 – para. 252 et seq.) and the granting of discretion to the competent authority regarding the content (in the case of monetary benefits: the amount) of the benefit in the core area of securing subsistence. In the words of the Federal Constitutional Court, this aspect concerns the legislature's duty to enact the regulations itself that are decisive for the realization of fundamental rights (Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 09.02.2010 – 1 BvL 1/09 et al. – para. 136; cf. Social Court Mainz, Referral Order of 18.04.2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, paras. 315 et seq.).
Furthermore, the specific and sufficiently defined benefit claims must ultimately be justifiable against the standard of the statutory definition of what is essential for survival (SG Mainz, referral decision of 18.04.2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, para. 334 ff.).
If the legislature does not grant a specific group of fundamental rights holders a right to subsistence-level benefits that meet the minimum requirements described above, a situation is unconstitutional (SG Mainz, referral decision of 18.04.2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, para. 337 ff.).
2.4 Based on the foregoing, the exclusion of claims under Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 No. 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in the version applicable since October 31, 2024, violates the fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living in accordance with human dignity under Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (GG) (see also Frerichs in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGB XII, 4th edition, Section 1 AsylbLG (as of December 23, 2024), marginal note 54).
The Chamber is convinced that the provision is unconstitutional because, after the expiry of the bridging benefits under Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), even the physical minimum subsistence level is not guaranteed for the affected group of people. The hardship clause in Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 6 of the AsylbLG, which allows for the provision of such benefits, does not meet the constitutional requirements for guaranteeing a dignified minimum subsistence level. This is because, on the factual side, this clause consists of extremely vague legal terms ("Insofar as special circumstances require this in individual cases, (...)" or "(...) insofar as this is necessary in individual cases due to special circumstances to overcome a particular hardship and to cover a temporary need"). The use of overly vague legal terms (cf. already Social Court Mainz, referral order of 12 December 2014 – S 3 AS 130/14 – para. 252 et seq.) violates the legislature's obligation to enact the regulations relevant for the realization of fundamental rights itself (Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 9 February 2010 – 1 BvL 1/09 et al. – para. 136; cf. Social Court Mainz, referral order of 18 April 2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, para. 315 et seq.) and not to leave this to the administration and, if necessary, to subsequent court proceedings.
The constitutional principle that the provisions essential for the realization of fundamental rights must be enacted by the parliamentary legislature (the "essentiality doctrine") is invoked in two ways in connection with the fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living that ensures human dignity. Firstly, the very dogmatic classification of the right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living as a fundamental right necessitates consideration of the essentiality principle (see Konzak, NVwZ 1997, p. 873). Secondly, the specific nature of its classification as a "guarantee right" means that the fundamental right can only be realized through the fulfillment of the legislative mandate. Both the fundamental rights status and the constitution of the right to subsistence as a guaranteed right thus shape the "nature of the life situation to be regulated with regard to the purpose of the norm" and determine the "intensity of the effects on those subject to the regulation" (Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 22 November 2000 – 1 BvR 2307/94 et al. – para. 325) in the sense that the legislature must design the regulations for securing the subsistence minimum as precisely as possible and thereby enable the administration to be bound as effectively as possible to the fundamental legislative decisions (Social Court Mainz, Referral Order of 18 April 2016 – S 3 AS 149/16 –, para. 325).
The question of when the requirement of sufficient definiteness (or determinability) is met cannot be defined abstractly, since the text of the law, the culture of interpretation, and the rule of law—apart from cases of numerical exactitude—never allow for a complete determination of the case decision (Müller/Christensen, Juristische Methodik [Legal Methodology], 10th edition 2009, p. 195). In this sense, legal concepts are therefore always indeterminate. It follows that the requirements for the definiteness of a law cannot be considered in isolation from its function, and the standard for compliance with the principle of definiteness can only be a degree of determinability appropriate to the subject matter being regulated (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, decision of August 8, 1978 – 2 BvL 8/77 – para. 101). That this degree of determinability must be particularly high in the statutory design of the fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living that ensures human dignity arises, firstly, from the fundamental rights-realizing function of the law (Stölting, SGb 2013, p. 545), and secondly, and essentially, from the fact that the legislator must first carry out the political transformation of the "societal views on what is necessary for a life of human dignity" (Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 09.02.2010 – 1 BvL 1/09 et al. – para. 138) in order to fulfill its obligation to shape the law.
With the provision in Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 6 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), the legislator essentially leaves the decision regarding whether or not benefits are provided to the group of people affected by the exclusion of entitlement – in addition to the complete exclusion of socio-cultural needs – with respect to further subsistence needs, to the administration and the courts by using vague legal terms. At the same time, by creating a complete exclusion of benefits with an exception clause, the legislator clearly expresses that the constitutional obligation to guarantee a dignified subsistence minimum is, as a rule, not to be fulfilled.
The Chamber is therefore convinced that the restriction of entitlement under Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 No. 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is unconstitutional because, without sufficient compensation through a sufficiently specific, concrete legal entitlement to benefits, it excludes certain groups of fundamental rights holders who are in need of assistance in the constitutional sense and who actually reside in Germany from the guarantee of a dignified minimum standard of living.
2.5 Therefore, based on a preliminary constitutional assessment, it must be assumed that the legal basis for the restriction of benefits will not hold up and that the cessation or refusal to grant regular benefits under Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) will prove to be unlawful. If the provision in Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 No. 2 of the AsylbLG is found to be unconstitutional and void, the applicant will be entitled to benefits under Section 3 of the AsylbLG.
2.6 A constitutionally compliant interpretation of Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 6 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) should lead to the same (provisional) result, provided that this could ensure that every person actually residing in Germany has a right to subsistence-level benefits in the event of their need.
2.7 Against this background, it remains an open question whether the provision of Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 No. 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is also contrary to European law (see also Frerichs in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGB XII, 4th ed., Section 1 AsylbLG (as of December 23, 2024), para. 54). This could either be avoided by an interpretation of Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 6 AsylbLG that is consistent with European law, overridden by the primacy of EU law, or clarified by means of a preliminary ruling procedure before the European Court of Justice. However, in the Chamber's opinion, all of the aforementioned possibilities would ultimately lead to the conclusion that the exclusion from benefits under Section 1 Paragraph 4 Sentence 1 No. 2 AsylbLG cannot apply to the applicant and that she must be granted subsistence benefits.
3. The applicant has also credibly demonstrated grounds for an injunction. Since the requested benefits are intended to secure the minimum subsistence level, urgency must be assumed. The vast majority of the benefits to be granted are intended to cover current needs and are required for this purpose. Therefore, waiting for a decision on the merits is unreasonable.
The existence of grounds for an injunction is not called into question by the fact that the respondent, in recognition of the constitutional and European legal questionability of the regulation, actually provides certain, albeit limited, benefits. If the underlying regulation were unconstitutional, there would also be no legal basis for a more differentiated limitation of benefits. Due to the lack of sufficient statutory standards, there would be no guarantee that the applicant could actually cover a dignified minimum standard of living with the benefits provided. Furthermore, the benefits, which are merely granted in practice, could be discontinued at any time without any change in the legal or factual circumstances.
4. Specialized courts are not prevented from granting preliminary legal protection if they deem the challenged regulation unconstitutional, simply because they cannot decide on the question of unconstitutionality themselves, but must instead obtain a ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 100 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. While the Federal Constitutional Court's monopoly on declaring a law unconstitutional means that a court may only draw conclusions from its finding of unconstitutionality in the main proceedings after the Federal Constitutional Court has established this finding, this does not preclude the court from granting preliminary legal protection. However, Article 100 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law does not prevent the specialized courts from granting preliminary legal protection based on their legal opinion even before the Federal Constitutional Court's decision, which may be obtained in the main proceedings, if this appears necessary in the interest of effective legal protection under the circumstances of the case and does not prejudge the decision on the merits (Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of June 24, 1992 – 1 BvR 1028/91 –, para. 29). From a procedural law perspective, the necessity of considering the unconstitutionality of a legal provision when reviewing the issuance of a regulatory order pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Social Courts Act arises from the fact that the prospects of success in the main proceedings must be assessed. This includes the possibility of conducting a specific judicial review procedure under Article 100 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law in the main proceedings and its prospects of success (Social Court Speyer, decision of 17 August 2017 – S 16 AS 908/17 ER –, para. 75).
This does not concern the derivation of specific benefit claims directly from the fundamental right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living (rejecting this: North Rhine-Westphalia Higher Social Court, decision of March 16, 2017 – L 19 AS 190/17 B ER –, para. 47), but rather the obligation to provisionally fulfill benefit claims regulated by ordinary law while temporarily not applying a restriction or exclusion clause in the justified expectation that the Federal Constitutional Court will declare this unconstitutional in the context of main proceedings with binding effect also for the present main proceedings (cf. Speyer Social Court, decision of August 17, 2017 – S 16 AS 908/17 ER –, para. 76).
The respondent was therefore obliged to grant provisional benefits in accordance with Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG).
5. The decision on costs is based on Section 193 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Social Court Act (SGG). The applicant has implicitly expressed through his application for legal aid that he is also requesting reimbursement of his necessary extrajudicial costs from the respondent.
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