DECISION
In the legal dispute
xxx,
– Applicant –
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam, Lange Geismarstraße 55,
37073 Göttingen
against
State of Rhineland-Palatinate,
represented by the Supervisory and Service Directorate,
Willy-Brandt-Platz 3, 54290 Trier
– Respondent –
The 16th Chamber of the Speyer Social Court issued the following ruling on June 25, 2025:
Judge at the Social Court xxx
decided:
1. The respondent is ordered by way of preliminary injunction to provide the applicant with provisionally unrestricted benefits pursuant to Sections 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the period from June 1, 2025 to August 31, 2025, but at the latest until a decision on the applicant's objection of May 26, 2025 becomes final or until the applicant leaves the federal territory, insofar as these benefits are granted as monetary benefits.
2. Furthermore, the application is rejected.
3. The respondent shall reimburse the applicant for the necessary extrajudicial costs.
REASONS
I.
The applicant seeks, by way of an interim injunction, to compel the respondent to grant benefits in accordance with Sections 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in a lawful amount.
The applicant, born in 1996, is an Ethiopian national and lives in communal accommodation. He receives benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) from the respondent not through an official decision, but through de facto approval.
According to the decision of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees dated January 8, 2025, the applicant's asylum application was rejected as inadmissible. Furthermore, the application to amend the decision of May 18, 2016, which had already definitively rejected the applicant's asylum application and threatened deportation to Italy, was rejected with regard to the finding that no prohibitions on deportation exist under Section 60 of the Residence Act. For further details and explanations in the aforementioned decision, reference is made to the administrative file of the respondent.
According to the administrative file, the respondent granted the applicant current cash benefits amounting to only €103 per month. These benefits were paid in cash every two weeks in the amount of €48.10 each, for example, on June 4, 2025, for the period from June 2, 2025, to June 15, 2025. The remaining benefits are provided by the respondent in the form of benefits in kind.
The applicant, who was later represented by his legal counsel, filed an objection by letter dated 26 May 2025 against the reduction of basic benefits pursuant to Sections 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG).
On June 1, 2025, the applicant, through his legal representative, filed an application for preliminary legal protection with the Speyer Social Court, seeking to compel the respondent to grant the applicant, provisionally and subject to the right of recovery, the basic benefits pursuant to Sections 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in full from the date of receipt of this application by the court, insofar as these benefits are granted as monetary benefits, until a legally binding decision is reached on the applicant's objection of May 26, 2025, against the respondent's actual provision of benefits, taking into account the court's legal opinion.
The court reasoned, with extensive reference to case law and legal literature, that Section 1 Paragraph 4 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) as the legal basis for reducing basic benefits under Sections 3 and 3a of the AsylbLG violates both the provisions of the Basic Law and EU law, specifically Article 20 of Directive 2013/33/EU. Accordingly, the applicant is entitled to the full benefits under Sections 3 and 3a of the AsylbLG. For the specific arguments explaining the incompatibility with constitutional and European legal requirements, reference is made to pages 22 et seq. of the court file.
The applicant requests:
The respondent is ordered, by way of preliminary injunction, to grant the applicant, provisionally and subject to the right of recovery, until a final and binding decision is reached on the applicant's objection of May 26, 2025, against the de facto provision of benefits by the respondent, in accordance with the legal opinion of the court, the basic benefits pursuant to Sections 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in full from the date of receipt of this application by the court, insofar as these benefits are granted as monetary benefits.
The respondent requests that
the application be rejected.
The court reasoned that the applicant had failed to demonstrate either a claim to an injunction or grounds for such an injunction. The applicant would receive the benefits to which he would be entitled under a constitutionally and European-law-compliant interpretation of Sections 1(4) and 1a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). Neither the Federal Constitutional Court nor the Court of Justice of the European Union had deemed the relevant provisions unconstitutional or incompatible with European law. No such decisions exist. Accordingly, the applicant's concerns regarding the legality of the relevant provisions, raised with reference to case law and legal literature, could not prevent their application through expedited proceedings and thus, for example, circumvent the Federal Constitutional Court's power to declare constitutional provisions unconstitutional. Furthermore, the applicant had not yet demonstrated grounds for an injunction in the form of a special need for urgency in the present proceedings. Regarding the respondent's detailed explanations in support of his view, reference is made to pages 15 et seq. and 39 et seq. of the court file.
For further details of the facts and the legal arguments, reference is made to the contents of the court file and the administrative file of the respondent. These will form the basis of the court's decision.
II.
The application is admissible and unfounded to the extent stated.
The provisional legal protection in social court proceedings is governed by the provisions in §§ 86a, 86b SGG.
Pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 1 of the Social Court Act (SGG), the court of first instance may, insofar as – as here – no case under Paragraph 1 applies, issue a preliminary injunction concerning the subject matter of the dispute upon application. The necessary element is the risk that a change in the existing situation could frustrate or significantly impede the applicant's exercise of a right. According to Sentence 2, a preliminary injunction is also permissible to regulate a provisional state of affairs with regard to a disputed legal relationship if such regulation appears necessary to avert substantial disadvantages. In preliminary legal proceedings, a substantive claim must be subjected to summary review, and the final decision may not, in principle, be anticipated. Only in exceptional cases may this principle be deviated from, namely when disputed benefits serve to ensure a life of human dignity. This obligation of the state is based on the constitutionally protected human dignity in conjunction with the constitutionally enshrined social welfare state principle (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, decision of May 12, 2005, 1 BvR 569/05). It follows that in these cases it may be necessary, in particular, to anticipate a decision on the merits if otherwise a right would be thwarted or a merely provisional arrangement is unreasonable. The requested preliminary injunction, which can only be issued in the form of a regulatory order pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Social Court Procedure Act (SGG), can only be granted if the asserted claim is sufficiently probable (claim for an injunction) and if, due to its non-fulfillment, serious and otherwise unavoidable disadvantages are imminent, even subsequently by a decision on the merits (see, in particular, Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of February 25, 2009, 1 BvR 120/09; similarly, Higher Social Court of Rhineland-Palatinate, Decision of February 12, 2010, L 1 SO 84/09 B ER). The claim for an injunction is thus the substantive legal claim on which the request is based, while the ground for an injunction lies in the urgency (see, for example, Higher Social Court of Rhineland-Palatinate, Decision of October 18, 2007, L 1 ER 242/07 AS). Pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 4 of the Social Court Act (SGG) in conjunction with Section 920 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), these prerequisites for the claim must be substantiated to a degree of probability (Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b Rn. 16b, 41). The claim and the grounds for the injunction are not unrelated but, due to their functional connection, form a dynamic system (similarly Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b Rn. 27). If a corresponding action would be manifestly inadmissible or unfounded, there is no right that needs to be protected in preliminary injunction proceedings. The application for a preliminary injunction must then be rejected, even if grounds for the injunction exist. If, on the other hand, the action were obviously admissible and well-founded, the requirements for the grounds for the order would be reduced accordingly, although their existence could not be dispensed with entirely (see, in particular, the decision of the Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court of 15 February 2005, L 5 ER 5/05 KR, the decision of 25 September 2006, L 5 ER 129/06 KR, and the decision of 12 February 2010, L 1 SO 84/09 B ER; see, for example, Jüttner/Wehrhahn in: Breitkreuz/Fichte, SGG, 3rd ed. 2020, § 86b para. 57). In preliminary injunction proceedings where the outcome of a lawsuit is ultimately entirely open, a comprehensive balancing of interests is required (see Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 12 May 2005, 1 BvR 569/05, decision of 1 February 2010, 1 BvR 20/10, decision of 6 February 2013, 1 BvR 2366/12, and decision of 6 August 2014, 1 BvR 1453/12). These considerations must include, on the one hand, the consequences that would arise if the court did not issue the preliminary injunction but the claim was subsequently upheld in the main proceedings, and on the other hand, the consequences that would arise if the preliminary injunction were issued but the main proceedings were unsuccessful (see Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of 15 February 2005, L 5 ER 5/05 KR; Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 29a). The decisive factor for a balancing of interests required when the outcome of the main proceedings is uncertain is whether, taking into account the interests of all those affected, it is unreasonable to expect the applicant to await the decision in the main proceedings (similarly, Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of November 11, 2004, L 5 ER 75/04 KA; see also Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 28, 29a). However, the time disadvantages associated with any main proceedings are not sufficient to establish urgency (cf. generally, Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of May 23, 2003, L 5 ER 35/03 KR; Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 29a). The same applies to purely non-material disadvantages (see also, among many others, Krodel, NZS, 2002, 180 (182)). With regard to monetary benefits sought for the past, i.e., for the period prior to the application to the court, there is regularly no ground for an order unless a need to catch up is credibly demonstrated (cf. Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of 23 September 2010, L 3 AS 369/10 B ER, and decision of 10 November 2010, L 3 AS 535/10 B ER; Keller in: Mayer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, 14th ed. 2023, § 86b SGG Rn. 29a, 35a). This requires that a severe and unreasonable existential hardship persists in the present due to the past denial of benefits (see Bavarian State Social Court, decision of May 25, 2016, L 11 AS 272/16 B ER; Saxon State Social Court, decision of March 28, 2022, L 6 AS 86/22 B ER). Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to expect an applicant to pursue the claim for retroactive benefits in the main proceedings. An application for an interim injunction is inadmissible for lack of a legitimate interest in legal protection, or at least unfounded for lack of a claim to the injunction, if the objective sought by the application for interim relief has been definitively rejected (see generally the decisions of the Higher Social Court of Saarland of 11 August 2005, L 9 B 4/05 AS; the Higher Social Court of Hesse of 24 April 2006, L 9 AS 39/06; the Higher Social Court of Bavaria of 17 November 2008, L 11 B 942/08 AS ER, and of 5 February 2009, L 11 AS 20/09 B ER; Keller in: Mayer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 26d). Then there is no right that needs to be protected in expedited proceedings; there is no open main issue within the meaning of Section 86b Paragraph 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG). Generally, there is no need for legal protection, or at least no ground for an order, if a simpler and reasonable means of achieving the desired outcome is available compared to seeking expedited judicial protection (see Keller in: Mayer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, 14th edition 2023, SGG Section 86b, marginal note 26).
Based on the principles set out above, the applicant has credibly demonstrated a claim to an injunction and grounds for an injunction.
It is highly doubtful whether the provisions of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) relevant to the decision in this case are compatible with the requirements of the Basic Law (GG) and EU law. Both are disputed in legal literature and case law. The court cannot definitively resolve both questions in preliminary injunction proceedings, as the assessment of unconstitutionality, as the respondent correctly points out, is the responsibility of the Federal Constitutional Court, and the question of the compatibility of the relevant provisions with EU law is subject to final assessment by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the Chamber's opinion, proceedings under Article 100 of the Basic Law are not applicable in these preliminary injunction proceedings – regardless of whether the requirements of Article 100 of the Basic Law are met – taking into account the requirements formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court in this regard (see, among many others, the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of July 19, 1996, 1 BvL 39/95, concerning the requirements for a referral under Article 100 of the Basic Law in expedited proceedings). The Chamber is also unable at this point to definitively determine whether it is convinced of the unconstitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) within the meaning of Article 100 of the Basic Law (GG), as this decision can only be made by the full panel of judges, which is not available in preliminary injunction proceedings (see Federal Constitutional Court, decision of April 15, 2005, 1 BvL 6/03, BeckRS 2005, 30354507, beck-online). Furthermore, initiating a referral procedure to clarify the conformity of the relevant provisions with European law is not appropriate in preliminary injunction proceedings (similarly, Higher Social Court of North Rhine-Westphalia, decision of June 8, 2018, L 7 AS 420/18 B ER). In this respect, the prospects of success for the applicant's objection and for any subsequent main proceedings must be considered uncertain, even though the Chamber expresses considerable doubts at this point regarding the compatibility of the decisive provision with constitutional and European law. With regard to the question of the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned provision, reference is made, among many others, to the detailed and instructive reasoning of the 15th Chamber of the Speyer Social Court in its decision of February 20, 2025, S 15 AY 5/25 ER (see ASR 2025, pp. 76 et seq., beck-online). The Chamber also refers to the reasoning in the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of July 18, 2021, 1 BvL 10/10 (cited according to juris). The Chamber finds that the arguments presented leave little room for the assumption that the relevant requirements in question can be considered constitutional in light of the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court. For the Court states:
“bb) Moreover, even a short period of residence or prospect of residence in Germany does not justify limiting the right to a guaranteed minimum standard of living to the securing of physical existence. Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law requires that the minimum standard of living must be guaranteed in every case and at all times (cf. BVerfGE 125, 175 <253>). Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law guarantees a minimum standard of living that ensures human dignity, which is to be secured by benefits to be designed within the social welfare state as defined in Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, as a unified fundamental right encompassing the physical and socio-cultural minimum. Foreign nationals do not lose their claim to status as social individuals simply because they leave their homeland and do not reside permanently in the Federal Republic of Germany (cf. Rothkegel, ZAR 2010, p. 373 <374>). The dignified existence, which must be understood as a unified whole, must therefore be guaranteed from the beginning of the Residence in the Federal Republic of Germany can be realized.
c) Considerations of migration policy aimed at keeping benefits for asylum seekers and refugees low in order to avoid creating incentives for migration through a potentially high level of benefits compared internationally cannot, in the first place, justify lowering the standard of benefits below the physical and socio-cultural minimum subsistence level (see the recommendation for a resolution and the report of the Committee on Family Affairs and Senior Citizens <13th Committee> of May 24, 1993, Bundestag printed paper 12/5008, pp. 13 et seq.). The human dignity guaranteed in Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law cannot be relativized by migration policy
Regarding the question of compatibility with European legal requirements, reference is made, among many others, to the statements of the Federal Social Court in its decision to suspend proceedings and refer the matter to the European Court of Justice of 25 July 2024, B 8 AY 6/23 R (see NZS 2025, p. 221 et seq.). In this respect, the Chamber is of the opinion that there are indeed prospects of success on the merits, although, in accordance with the above explanations, the Chamber cannot definitively establish this.
In such a case, the applicant's fundamental rights must be fully considered in the balancing of interests, according to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court. The courts must protect and promote the fundamental rights of the individual. This applies particularly when it comes to safeguarding human dignity. The specialized courts must prevent any violation of this constitutional guarantee, even if it only appears possible or is only temporary (Federal Constitutional Court, decision of May 12, 2005, 1 BvR 569/05 = NVwZ 2005, 927, beck-online). In this respect, the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court has also clarified that the monopoly of the Federal Constitutional Court to declare norms invalid, as enshrined in Article 100 of the Basic Law, does not preclude the issuance of an interim injunction by the specialized courts in order to prevent violations of fundamental rights (see Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 19 July 1996, 1 BvL 39/95).
The decisive factor for the success of the present proceedings is therefore whether, considering the interests of all parties involved, it is unreasonable to expect the applicant to await the decision in the main proceedings. In the present case, however, it must be noted that without the requested order, serious and unreasonable disadvantages would arise that could not be remedied later and which a subsequent decision in the main proceedings would no longer be able to eliminate. This is because the current preliminary injunction proceedings concern the safeguarding of the constitutionally guaranteed minimum subsistence level during the proceedings. If, however, the minimum subsistence level is not covered during the main proceedings, this impairment cannot be remedied retroactively, even if the benefits obtained in the appeal proceedings are granted retroactively. In this respect, the balancing of interests must also be carried in favor of the applicant, even considering the applicant's right to access to justice.
In this respect, the grounds for an injunction, which the respondent denied, are also present in the present proceedings. The grounds for an injunction arise from the essential nature of the withheld benefits, which are crucial for the applicant's basic needs. The injunction is necessary to avert significant disadvantages for the applicant, as the insufficient benefits granted would exclude him from the level of support that the legislature considers necessary to cover the socio-cultural minimum subsistence level guaranteed under Article 1 Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. Higher standards for substantiating the grounds for an injunction are not applicable in this case. Furthermore, less stringent requirements apply to the existence of grounds for an injunction if, upon examination of the facts and the law – as in the present case – success in the main proceedings is likely.
The grounds for the injunction are not eliminated in the present case by the fact that the respondent, due to his own doubts about the compatibility of the relevant regulation with the requirements of the constitution and European law, actually provides certain, albeit limited, benefits. If the relevant legal provisions were unconstitutional and/or incompatible with European law, there would be no legal basis for a constitutionally compliant restriction of benefits. In the absence of legislative guidelines, there would be no guarantee that the applicant could actually cover his dignified minimum standard of living with the benefits provided.
The respondent was therefore ordered to grant provisional benefits pursuant to Sections 3 and 3a of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), and the application was granted to the extent specified in the judgment. The application was otherwise dismissed. The Chamber exercised its discretion regarding the period of the respondent's obligation by ordering provisional benefits to be provided initially until August 31, 2025. In doing so, the Chamber considered the provisional nature of the expedited proceedings and the reasonable duration for conducting an appeal procedure pursuant to Section 88 Paragraph 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG).
The decision on costs is based on Section 193 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Social Court Act (SGG) and is based on the outcome of the legal dispute.
This decision is unappealable pursuant to Section 172 Paragraph 3 No. 1 of the Social Court Act (SGG) in conjunction with Section 144 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 No. 1 of the Social Court Act (SGG), as the value of the subject matter of the appeal mentioned therein is not reached in the present case.
