DECISION
in the legal dispute
xxx,
– Plaintiff –
Legal representative: Attorney Sven Adam
, Lange-Geismar-Str. 55, 37073 Göttingen
against
City of Pforzheim,
represented by the Mayor,
Marktplatz 4, 75175 Pforzheim
– Defendant –
The 12th Chamber of the Social Court of Karlsruhe
on July 23, 2025 in Karlsruhe
through Judge xxx of the Social Court
without oral proceedings:
The defendant must reimburse the plaintiff's extrajudicial costs in the legal dispute S 12 AY 1244/25.
REASONS
After the main issue has been resolved, the court decides by order whether and to what extent the parties are required to reimburse each other for extrajudicial costs (§ 193 para. 1 sentence 3 SGG).
The proceedings S 12 AY 1244/25 have been settled, as the plaintiff's declaration of settlement dated June 24, 2025, is to be interpreted as a withdrawal of the action pursuant to Sections 106 Paragraph 1 and 123 of the Social Court Act (SGG).
The decision regarding the reimbursement of costs is made without regard to any applications from the parties involved. Section 193, paragraph 1, sentences 1 and 3 of the Social Court Procedure Act (SGG) does not contain any specifications for the content of the cost decision, which is why the Social Court decides at its equitable discretion based on general principles. All circumstances of the individual case must be taken into account, in particular the reason for filing the lawsuit and the previous state of the case and the legal arguments (see, e.g., decisions of the Higher Social Court of Baden-Württemberg of June 17, 1999, L 11 SB 2062/99 AK-B and of January 24, 2000, L 11 SB 4587/99 AK-B).
Even in the specific case of the settlement of an action for failure to act, the general principles state that the outcome of the proceedings is determined based on the facts and legal arguments at the time of settlement. This is based on the legal principles of Sections 91(1) sentence 1, 91a(1) sentence 1, and 92(1) sentence 1 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), Sections 154(1), (2), and (4), and 155(1) and (2) of the German Administrative Court Procedure Act (VwGO). However, no reimbursement of costs is granted because the action remained inadmissible if the action was filed before the expiry of the statutory waiting period and the authority issues the requested decision within that period. In contrast, reimbursement of costs is generally possible if the action for failure to act was admissible and well-founded during its period of pending litigation. This is particularly the case if the authority, contrary to Section 88 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Social Court Act (SGG), does not decide on the application within the statutory waiting period and there was no sufficient reason for the delay (Federal Constitutional Court, 08.02.2023 – 1 BvR 311/22 –, para. 13, juris). A sufficient reason may exist in the case of a temporary exceptional workload, for example, if many applications have to be processed for a limited period due to a change in the law, or in the case of a relocation or organizational changes of an authority (Higher Social Court of Saxony, 17.03.2008, L 2 B 91/08 AS).
If such a reason for the delay existed and was either communicated by the authority or did not need to be communicated because the reason was already known, the costs are not reimbursable under the principle of success and causation. In this respect, the cost decision can be based on considerations of fault; in such cases, an interim notification is unnecessary (BeckOGK/Diehm, 1 August 2022, SGG § 88 para. 104).
However, the defendant authority must generally reimburse the plaintiff's extrajudicial costs because the plaintiff could reasonably expect a decision before the deadline if the action was filed after the expiry of the waiting period. The question of whether the defendant authority (at least initially) had a sufficient reason for its inaction is generally irrelevant, provided the plaintiff was unaware of this reason and therefore could reasonably expect a decision (Claus in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGG, 2nd ed., § 88 SGG (as of June 15, 2022), para. 70). If the plaintiff was unaware of the sufficient reason for the delay and could not have been aware of it even with reasonable diligence, there was nevertheless cause to file a lawsuit, so that the costs must be imposed (at least partially) on the defendant authority (Jaritz in: Roos/Wahrendorf/Müller, SGG, § 88 SGG Rn. 101; SG Augsburg, 16.07.2020, S 12 KR 763/19). It follows that the authority can avoid the burden of costs if it has informed the plaintiff of a sufficient reason for the lack of a decision, for example, by means of a notification or an interim message, whereby a formulaic notification is insufficient (LSG Bayern, 09.06.2009, L 19 B 125/08 R; Jaritz in: Roos/Wahrendorf/Müller, SGG, § 88 SGG Rn. 103).
Accordingly, the defendant in case S 12 AY 1244/26 is obligated to reimburse the plaintiff's extrajudicial costs. The action for failure to act, filed on May 6, 2025, was admissible and well-founded from the date it became pending. The defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff's objection of January 13, 2025, against the decision of January 30, 2024, within the three-month waiting period stipulated in Section 88, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG) for objection proceedings.
It must be conceded that there was sufficient reason for the delay in the objection proceedings. The defendant rightly pointed this out in its statement of defense dated June 11, 2025. The defendant had to manage the conversion of approximately 600 cases under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act to the payment card system. This included the technical and administrative implementation, in particular the creation, issuance, and activation of the cards, as well as the necessary training and communication with the benefit recipients. This short-term and temporary prioritization of the conversion process was urgently necessary given its vital importance to the benefit recipients concerned. Therefore, there were sufficient grounds for the exceptional delay in deciding on the plaintiff's objection within three months.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plaintiff had grounds for filing an action for failure to act on May 6, 2025, because the defendant had provided insufficient information regarding the reasons for the delay in the objection proceedings on February 19, 2025. The defendant's communication consisted of only one sentence and contained an incomprehensible reference to the implementation of a "system change." The communication was therefore "formulaic" within the meaning of the aforementioned commentary and case law on the principles of cost reimbursement for actions for failure to act.
The defendant cannot successfully argue that the necessary conversion processes were generally known due to various legal reforms and media coverage. From the internal perspective of an authority directly involved in the "system change," this may have been the case on February 19, 2025. However, it was not apparent to the plaintiff or his representative that this formulaic phrase referred to the introduction of the payment card, as the term "system change" could encompass anything.
The plaintiff therefore had grounds to file an action for failure to act, which the defendant only remedied on May 22, 2025, during the course of the proceedings, by deciding on the objection.
This decision is final and cannot be appealed, § 172 para. 3 no. 3 in conjunction with § 193 SGG.
