DECISION
In the legal dispute
xxx,
– Applicant –
Legal representative:
Attorney Sven Adam, Lange Geismarstraße 55,
37073 Göttingen
against
City of Ludwigshafen am Rhein,
represented by the Mayor,
Bismarckstraße 25, 67059 Ludwigshafen am Rhein
– Respondent –
The 16th Chamber of the Social Court of Speyer decided on February 9, 2026, through
Judge xxx of the Social Court
:
1. The respondent is ordered by way of preliminary injunction to provide the applicant with provisional benefits pursuant to Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in conjunction with the provisions of Book XII of the German Social Code (SGB XII) for the period from September 5, 2025 to July 31, 2026, but at the latest until a decision has been made on the applicant's objection to the decision of September 4, 2025 or until the applicant leaves the federal territory.
2. Furthermore, the application is rejected.
3. The respondent shall reimburse the applicant for the necessary extrajudicial costs.
REASONS
I.
The applicant seeks, by way of an interim injunction, to compel the respondent to grant benefits pursuant to Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG).
The applicant, born on xxx, is an Egyptian national and entered Germany from Belarus on July 17, 2022. He has been receiving benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) from the respondent for several years.
By decision dated November 11, 2024, the respondent rejected the applicant's request for benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). The grounds for the decision were that the applicant had likely not abused his right to claim benefits under Section 2 AsylbLG by manipulating his length of stay. The applicant had already been requested by the Trier city administration in 2022 to submit a valid passport or any documents and other records in his possession that could be relevant to establishing his identity and nationality, or to cooperate in a manner that would allow for his identification and thus the issuance of a substitute travel document. The applicant failed to comply with these obligations. For further details in the aforementioned decision, please refer to pages 104 et seq. of the respondent's administrative file.
On November 27, 2024, the applicant filed an application for a preliminary injunction with the Speyer Social Court, seeking to compel the respondent to grant him benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). The proceedings were conducted under file number S 15 AY 41/24 ER. In those proceedings, the respondent requested that the application be dismissed, arguing that the applicant had abused his right to remain in Germany. By order dated February 12, 2025, the Speyer Social Court ordered the respondent to grant the applicant provisional benefits under Section 2 of the AsylbLG from November 27, 2024, until July 31, 2025, but no longer than until a decision is reached on the applicant's pending appeals. The respondent did not appeal this order. Decisions by the respondent regarding the pending appeals, to which the operative part of the aforementioned order refers, are available.
By decision dated September 4, 2025, the respondent granted the applicant benefits in the amount of €921.00 pursuant to Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) for the period beginning in August 2025. The decision contains no information whatsoever as to why the applicant does not receive benefits pursuant to Section 2 of the AsylbLG. For the remaining information in the aforementioned decision, reference is made to pages 6 et seq. of the court file.
The applicant, represented by his legal counsel, filed an objection with the respondent against the aforementioned decision by letter dated September 5, 2025. Prior to providing grounds for the objection, he requested access to the case file.
By letter dated September 5, 2025, the applicant, represented by his legal representative, filed an application with the Speyer Social Court for an interim injunction, aimed at granting higher benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG).
In support of his application, the applicant refers, among other things, to his submissions in proceedings S 15 AY 41/24 ER. Furthermore, he points out that, as already explained in the aforementioned proceedings, there is currently no evidence that the applicant was requested to cooperate in obtaining identity documents. The request from the Trier city administration (see page 1 of the immigration office file) is undated and unsigned. There is also no dispatch confirmation. Moreover, no translation of this letter is available. The letter also contains no information whatsoever about what exactly is required of the applicant, who will bear the costs of a potential new passport application, and what the legal consequences would be if proof of identity is not provided. Contrary to the respondent's assertion, the residence permit orders do not contain any obligation to submit proof of identity. According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Social Court, for an abuse of rights within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) to be assumed, there must be a breach of duty that carries considerable weight in light of the principle of proportionality. Conduct is therefore only considered an abuse of rights if, taking into account the individual case, the specific situation of a foreigner in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the particular characteristics of the AsylbLG, it is inexcusable in the sense of being socially unacceptable. However, no such breach of duty exists in the present case. It should also be noted that the respondent considered appealing the court's decision in proceedings S 15 AY 41/24 ER, but apparently refrained from doing so because there is no evidence that the applicant was requested to obtain a passport and informed of his duty to cooperate. Furthermore, the AWO migration service explained in an email dated February 26, 2025 (see page 147 of the immigration office file) why the applicant was unable to produce a birth certificate and what efforts he had undertaken to obtain one. The applicant stated to his legal representative that he had intended to submit the birth certificate and its translation at an appointment with the immigration office in July. However, the employee declined to do so. The applicant also informed his legal representative on January 20, 2026, that he had submitted another copy of the birth certificate and the original certified German translation at a subsequent appointment with the immigration office. He also asked the employee there to inform the social welfare office. It should be noted again that, following the undated letter on page 1 of the immigration file, the immigration office never again requested the applicant to obtain a passport or reminded him of his duty to cooperate. The immigration file continues to clearly indicate that the applicant's identity is not unclear. Remarkably, the file even contains a comparison with the European Visa Information System (VIS) (see page 30 of the immigration office file), which lists a standard Egyptian passport with an identification number.
The applicant requests:
The respondent is ordered, by way of preliminary injunction, to grant the applicant the requested benefits in the statutory amount from the date of receipt of this application by the court, provisionally and subject to the right of recovery, until a final and binding decision is reached on the applicant's objection of September 5, 2025, against the respondent's decision of September 4, 2025, taking into account the legal opinion of the court.
The respondent requests that
the application be rejected.
The grounds for the application included the argument that the applicant is not entitled to benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). Insofar as the applicant relies on the decision of the Speyer Social Court of February 12, 2025 – S 15 AY 41/24 ER – to support his application, it should be noted that the court was unaware of the facts now described at that time. Furthermore, there are significant concerns regarding that earlier decision, as it impermissibly prejudged the merits of the case without the applicant having credibly demonstrated an unreasonable hardship that could not be averted otherwise. The court failed to recognize that the applicant was not without benefits, but rather had been granted benefits under Section 3 of the AsylbLG. The prerequisites for granting benefits under Section 2 of the AsylbLG, on the other hand, are not met. The applicant was requested by the Trier city administration to submit, or cooperate in the process of obtaining, a valid national passport or all documents and other records in his possession that could be relevant to establishing his identity and nationality by October 6, 2022, in order to facilitate his identification and the issuance of a replacement document. However, the applicant neither submitted a passport nor any other documents clarifying his identity, nor did he cooperate in clarifying his identity. The decision of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees dated August 1, 2023, refers to the applicant at various times as xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx, and finally as xxx, xxx. The applicant's legal representative refers to him as xxx, xxx, while the responsible issuing authority referred to him as xxx, xxx. The applicant's identity is therefore unclear, and the immigration office has stated that the applicant is unwilling to cooperate in clarifying his identity. According to Section 48 Paragraph 3 of the German Residence Act (AufenthG), a foreigner who does not possess a valid passport or passport substitute is obligated to cooperate in obtaining one. According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Social Court, a failure to cooperate constitutes an abuse of rights, as there is generally a significant public interest in the prompt termination of the residence of foreigners who are subject to enforceable deportation and live on public funds. The Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal has ruled that, in addition to fulfilling their duty to cooperate, the foreigner in question is not free to "remain completely inactive and passive, merely waiting to see what further actions the authorities demand of them," but must themselves initiate the necessary steps to remove the existing obstacle to deportation. The Bavarian State Social Court has already clarified in a ruling that, with regard to the foreigner's duty to cooperate under Section 48 Paragraph 3 of the Residence Act, it is solely the foreigner's responsibility to go to the diplomatic mission of their country of origin to apply for a passport, substitute travel documents, or to submit an application for re-registration, to provide truthful information, and to have the corresponding appointments certified. This must be distinguished from actions that are clearly without any impact on the possibility of departure or are demonstrably futile. This cannot be assumed in the present case. It is the usual obligation of everyone, not just foreigners, to possess valid identification documents. Ensuring this is a reasonable, not an impossible, task. Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the jurisprudence of the Federal Social Court, an impact on the length of stay exists even if, from a general and abstract perspective, the abusive conduct could typically prolong the length of stay. Furthermore, the entire duration of stay must be assessed. The Federal Social Court has also clarified that it is not relevant whether the foreigner behaves abusively after being legally obligated to leave the country, but rather emphasized that the abusive behavior could already exist before entry. Subsequent good conduct does not lead to the granting of analogous benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). Reference is made to the case law of the Federal Social Court in this regard. The applicant, who is obligated to leave the country, is aware that he must have a valid identity document to leave Germany. Since the applicant did not cooperate in obtaining a passport without justifiable reasons, abusive behavior must be assumed, so that benefits under Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) are not applicable. Given that the applicant is receiving benefits under Section 3 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) and has not credibly demonstrated any reasons why these benefits should be insufficient, especially since he also receives housing costs and has an entitlement under Section 4 of the AsylbLG, a preliminary order requiring the respondent to grant him benefits under Section 2 of the AsylbLG would constitute an inadmissible prejudgment of the merits of the case. Since the applicant, through his legal representative, has already filed an objection to the decision of September 4, 2025, and will seek a decision within the period stipulated in Section 88 of the Social Court Act (SGG), there is also no need for a prejudgment of the merits of the case.
The court has consulted the administrative file of the respondent, the administrative file of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the administrative file of the immigration authority and the court file for proceedings S 15 AY 41/24 ER and has informed the parties accordingly.
For further details of the facts and the legal arguments, reference is made to the contents of the court file, the court file relating to proceedings S 15 AY 41/24 ER, and the administrative files of the respondent, the immigration authority, and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. These documents—in particular the submissions of the parties contained therein—will form the basis of the court's decision.
II.
The application is admissible and justified to the extent stated.
The provisional legal protection in social court proceedings is governed by the provisions in §§ 86a, 86b SGG.
Pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 1 of the Social Court Act (SGG), the court of first instance may, insofar as – as here – no case under Paragraph 1 applies, issue a preliminary injunction concerning the subject matter of the dispute upon application. The necessary element is the risk that a change in the existing situation could frustrate or significantly impede the realization of a right of the applicants. According to Sentence 2, a preliminary injunction is also permissible to regulate a provisional state of affairs with regard to a disputed legal relationship if such regulation appears necessary to avert substantial disadvantages. In preliminary legal protection proceedings, a substantive claim must be subjected to summary review, and the final decision may not, in principle, be anticipated. Only in exceptional cases may this principle be deviated from if the disputed benefits serve to ensure a life of human dignity. This obligation of the state is based on the constitutionally protected human dignity in conjunction with the constitutionally enshrined social welfare state principle (cf. Federal Constitutional Court, decision of May 12, 2005, 1 BvR 569/05). It follows that in these cases it may be necessary, in particular, to anticipate a decision on the merits if otherwise a right would be thwarted or a merely provisional arrangement is unreasonable. The requested preliminary injunction, which can only be issued in the form of a regulatory order pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 of the Social Court Procedure Act (SGG), can only be granted if the asserted claim is sufficiently probable (claim for an injunction) and if, due to its non-fulfillment, serious and otherwise unavoidable disadvantages are imminent, even subsequently by a decision on the merits (see, in particular, Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of February 25, 2009, 1 BvR 120/09; similarly, Higher Social Court of Rhineland-Palatinate, Decision of February 12, 2010, L 1 SO 84/09 B ER). The claim for an injunction is thus the substantive legal claim on which the request is based, while the ground for an injunction lies in the urgency (see, for example, Higher Social Court of Rhineland-Palatinate, Decision of October 18, 2007, L 1 ER 242/07 AS). Pursuant to Section 86b Paragraph 2 Sentence 4 of the Social Court Act (SGG) in conjunction with Section 920 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), these prerequisites for the claim must be substantiated to a degree of probability (Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b Rn. 16b, 41). The claim and the grounds for the injunction are not unrelated but, due to their functional connection, form a dynamic system (similarly Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b Rn. 27). If a corresponding action would be manifestly inadmissible or unfounded, there is no right that needs to be protected in preliminary injunction proceedings. The application for a preliminary injunction must then be rejected, even if grounds for the injunction exist. If, on the other hand, the action were obviously admissible and well-founded, the requirements for the grounds for the order would be reduced accordingly, although their existence could not be dispensed with entirely (see, in particular, the decision of the Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court of 15 February 2005, L 5 ER 5/05 KR, the decision of 25 September 2006, L 5 ER 129/06 KR, and the decision of 12 February 2010, L 1 SO 84/09 B ER; see, for example, Jüttner/Wehrhahn in: Breitkreuz/Fichte, SGG, 3rd ed. 2020, § 86b para. 57). In preliminary injunction proceedings where the outcome of a lawsuit is ultimately entirely open, a comprehensive balancing of interests is required (see Federal Constitutional Court, decision of 12 May 2005, 1 BvR 569/05, decision of 1 February 2010, 1 BvR 20/10, decision of 6 February 2013, 1 BvR 2366/12, and decision of 6 August 2014, 1 BvR 1453/12). These considerations must include, on the one hand, the consequences that would arise if the court did not issue the preliminary injunction but the claim was subsequently upheld in the main proceedings, and on the other hand, the consequences that would arise if the preliminary injunction were issued but the main proceedings were unsuccessful (see Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of 15 February 2005, L 5 ER 5/05 KR; Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 29a). The decisive factor for a balancing of interests required when the outcome of the main proceedings is uncertain is whether, taking into account the interests of all those affected, it is unreasonable to expect the applicants to await the decision in the main proceedings (similarly, Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of November 11, 2004, L 5 ER 75/04 KA; see also Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 28, 29a). However, the time disadvantages associated with any main proceedings are not sufficient to establish urgency (cf. generally, Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of May 23, 2003, L 5 ER 35/03 KR; Keller in: Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, SGG, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 29a). The same applies to purely non-material disadvantages (see also, among many others, Krodel, NZS, 2002, 180 (182)). With regard to monetary benefits sought for the past, i.e., for the period prior to the application to the court, there is regularly no ground for an order unless a need to catch up is credibly demonstrated (cf. Rhineland-Palatinate State Social Court, decision of 23 September 2010, L 3 AS 369/10 B ER, and decision of 10 November 2010, L 3 AS 535/10 B ER; Keller in: MayerLadewig/Keller/Schmidt, 14th ed. 2023, § 86b SGG Rn. 29a, 35a). This requires that a severe and unreasonable existential hardship persists in the present due to the past denial of benefits (see Bavarian State Social Court, decision of May 25, 2016, L 11 AS 272/16 B ER; Saxon State Social Court, decision of March 28, 2022, L 6 AS 86/22 B ER). The applicants must also not be reasonably required to pursue the outstanding benefits through the main proceedings. An application for an interim injunction is inadmissible for lack of a legitimate interest in legal protection, or at least unfounded for lack of a claim to the injunction, if the objective sought by the application for interim relief has been definitively rejected (see generally the decisions of the Higher Social Court of Saarland of 11 August 2005, L 9 B 4/05 AS; the Higher Social Court of Hesse of 24 April 2006, L 9 AS 39/06; the Higher Social Court of Bavaria of 17 November 2008, L 11 B 942/08 AS ER, and of 5 February 2009, L 11 AS 20/09 B ER; Keller in: MayerLadewig/Keller/Schmidt, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 26d). Then there is no right that needs to be protected in expedited proceedings; there is no open main issue within the meaning of Section 86b Paragraph 2 of the Social Court Act (SGG). Generally, there is no need for legal protection, or at least no ground for an order, if a simpler and reasonable means of achieving the desired outcome is available compared to seeking expedited judicial protection (see Keller in: Mayer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt, 14th edition 2023, SGG Section 86b, marginal note 26).
Based on the principles set out above, the applicant has credibly demonstrated a claim to an injunction and grounds for an injunction.
The applicant has substantiated his claim to an injunction. He has – which is undisputed between the parties – a claim to ongoing benefits to secure his livelihood under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). The applicant also generally fulfills the eligibility requirements for the granting of so-called analogous benefits under Section 2 of the AsylbLG, i.e., higher benefits compared to the standard benefits under the AsylbLG, in accordance with Book XII of the German Social Code (SGB XII).
The only point of contention between the parties is whether the applicant, who entered Germany from Belarus on July 17, 2022, abused his rights by influencing his stay, which lasted longer than 18 months from January 18, 2024, within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) in the version applicable to him until February 26, 2024, pursuant to Section 20 AsylbLG. The applicant has credibly demonstrated that this is not the case.
Contrary to the respondent's view, the court – as already set out in the legally binding decision of 12 February 2025 in proceedings S 15 AY 41/24 ER – cannot recognize that the applicant's conduct cited by the respondent is to be regarded as an abuse of rights within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG), according to the preliminary assessment of the adjudicating chamber.
The term "abuse of rights" within the meaning of Section 2 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) is not defined in the AsylbLG itself. According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Social Court, it comprises, as reprehensible misconduct, an objective component – the element of abuse – and a subjective component – culpability. Objectively speaking, abuse of rights presupposes dishonest conduct that is disapproved of by the legal system. Within the scope of application of Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the AsylbLG, the nature, extent, and consequences of the breach of duty are so serious that, in light of the principle of proportionality, the breach must be given considerable weight. Accordingly, conduct is considered an abuse of rights only if, taking into account the individual case, the specific situation of a foreigner in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the particular characteristics of the AsylbLG, it is inexcusable in the sense of being socially unacceptable (see Federal Social Court, Judgment of June 24, 2021, B 7 AY 4/20 R – juris). Mere inaction is not considered an abuse of rights in this context (BeckOK AuslR/Spitzlei, 46th ed. 1.10.2025, AsylbLG § 2 Rn. 5 with further references, beck-online).
Since the authority must raise and substantiate the allegation of abusive self-influence regarding the length of stay and present all objective circumstances that could justify this allegation, the inability to prove abusive self-influence regarding the length of stay is to the detriment of the authority (see Filges in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGB XII, 3rd ed., § 2 AsylbLG (as of November 19, 2024), para. 212). The burden of proof for the existence of abusive stay therefore rests with the respondent.
Considering the submitted arguments and documents, the court cannot find evidence that the applicant has abused his right to remain in Egypt. Based on the submissions of the parties and the content of the documents, it is unclear to what extent the applicant was instructed to take concrete steps to obtain a passport in a manner understandable to him. Rather, the applicant appears willing to cooperate in obtaining, for example, his birth certificate, although various problems have arisen, as documented in the file. The court cannot find that the applicant has the financial means to arrange for the Egyptian state to issue a new passport, given that, according to the applicant's uncontested statements, this would require an expenditure of €7,000.
Based on the current state of facts and legal arguments, it cannot be assumed that the applicant has abused his rights to influence the length of stay, so that in the present case a claim for an injunction can be considered substantiated.
The grounds for the injunction arise from the essential nature of the withheld benefits, which are crucial for securing the applicant's livelihood. Since the requested benefits are intended to guarantee a minimum standard of living, the applicant's need for assistance is also considered urgent. The respondent does not dispute the applicant's need for assistance, and this is also evidenced by the benefit award already granted. The injunction is necessary to prevent significant disadvantages for the applicant, as the insufficient benefits granted would exclude the applicant from the level of support deemed necessary by the legislature to cover the socio-cultural minimum standard of living guaranteed under Article 1 Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. No higher standards of proof are required in this case to substantiate the grounds for the injunction.
Contrary to the respondent's assessment, the fact that a preliminary injunction may not, in principle, anticipate the final decision (Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt SGG/Keller, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 31, beck-online with further references) does not preclude the issuance of the preliminary injunction in the present case. A genuine anticipation of the main proceedings only exists if the measure cannot be retrospectively corrected (Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt SGG/Keller, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 31 with corresponding references to case law and literature, beck-online). A genuine anticipation of the main issue exists in the case of an obligation to grant provisional monetary benefits only if, exceptionally, a subsequent recovery of the benefits is legally precluded should the applicant lose in the main proceedings (Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt SGG/Keller, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 31, beck-online). The fact that difficulties arise in realizing this claim due to the applicant's lack of financial capacity does not render reversal impossible, but merely represents an enforcement risk (Meyer-Ladewig/Keller/Schmidt SGG/Keller, 14th ed. 2023, SGG § 86b para. 31 with further references, beck-online).
The respondent was therefore obligated, from the date of receipt of the application for preliminary legal protection (September 5, 2025), to provisionally provide the so-called analogous benefits pursuant to Section 2 of the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG) as stated in the operative part of the judgment, until a decision has been reached on the applicant's objection to the decision of September 4, 2025. The application was otherwise to be dismissed.
The decision on costs is based on the analogous application of Section 193 Paragraph 1 Sentence 3 of the Social Court Act (SGG) and is oriented towards the outcome of the legal dispute.
The following is information on legal remedies.
