DECISION
In the legal dispute
1. xxx,
Plaintiff,
2. xxx,
Plaintiff,
3. xxx,
Plaintiff,
4. xxx,
Plaintiff,
5. xxx,
Plaintiff,
all residing at: xxx,
Legal representative: for 1-5:
Attorney Sven Adam
, Lange-Geismar-Straße 55, 37073 Göttingen,
against
Jobcenter City of Kassel,
represented by the managing director Jutta Kahler,
Lewinskistraße 4, 34127 Kassel,
Defendant,
The 6th Chamber of the Social Court of Kassel decided on June 3, 2026, through its presiding judge, Judge xxx:
The respondent must reimburse the applicants for their extrajudicial costs.
REASONS
I.
On December 15, 2025, the applicants filed a lawsuit against the respondent at the Kassel Social Court for inaction, arguing that the respondent had failed to respond to their objection of June 4, 2024, against the decision of May 21, 2024. The dispute concerned the amount of housing costs.
The respondent replied that he had not been inactive, but that an expert opinion (ability to move/increased space requirements) had to be obtained from the health department.
The public health department issued the aforementioned medical report based on the file on February 2, 2026. Previously, the public health department had issued a report concerning the husband of applicant no. 1 on September 15, 2025.
By letter dated March 30, 2026, the respondent sent the amended decision (remedy) dated March 24, 2024, whereupon the respondents declared the action for failure to act settled and again requested that the respondent be ordered to pay the extrajudicial costs. Since, in the respondent's view, there had been no inaction, the respondent is unwilling to bear the costs.
II.
According to Section 193 of the Social Courts Act (SGG), the court decides on the reimbursement of costs by order upon application if the proceedings are concluded other than by judgment. The decision is made at the court's discretion, taking into account all circumstances of the individual case (see Meyer-Ladewig – Leitherer, Social Courts Act with Commentary, Section 193, marginal note 12b). These circumstances include the prospects of success of the action, the reasons for filing the action, and its resolution.
A prerequisite for a claim for reimbursement of costs is, firstly, the admissibility of the action for failure to act. The authority is only obligated to reimburse the applicant or appellant for costs after the main proceedings regarding the action for failure to act have been concluded if the latter could reasonably expect a decision before filing the action (see (Hessian State Social Court, decision of February 15, 2008 – L 7 B 184/07 AS –, para. 17, juris))
The balancing of interests to be carried out by the court in the context of the cost decision pursuant to Section 193 of the Social Court Act (SGG) at its equitable discretion leads in the present case, based on the aforementioned standards (principle of causation), to an obligation on the part of the respondent to reimburse the costs.
It is in accordance with the principle of causation to impose the costs on the authority if it fails to decide on the application within the statutory waiting period stipulated in Section 88 of the Social Court Act (SGG), as this generally gives the applicant cause to file an action for failure to act. An exception applies only if the affected party could already recognize at the time the action was filed that the action was unfounded because there was a sufficient reason for the administrative inaction. This is to be assumed if the authority communicated the substantive reasons delaying the decision to the plaintiff or if the applicant was aware of these reasons. If the authority has conducted investigations with the necessary expediency and taken the measures incumbent upon it to expedite the proceedings, it is equitable not to burden the authority with the plaintiff's extrajudicial costs, even partially; this applies at least if the authority has kept the plaintiff continuously informed. The delayed preparation of an expert opinion is borne by the authority.
The decisive factor is therefore whether the person concerned was aware of the reason for the delayed decision, i.e., whether the authority issued interim or status updates, and thus the question of whether the authority's conduct provided grounds for bringing an action (Wehrhahn in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGG, 2nd ed., § 193 SGG (as of 22.08.2024), para. 52)
A significant amount of time spent investigating the facts can constitute sufficient grounds for delay. Extensive medical or technical investigations, for example in matters of statutory accident insurance, particularly when the involvement of experts, review boards, and other persons or authorities is required and/or investigations must be conducted abroad, can justify exceeding the statutory deadlines for decisions in individual cases. However, this only applies if the investigative steps are objectively necessary and the authority can demonstrate in court proceedings that it has done everything possible to prevent a delay in the proceedings (Claus in: Schlegel/Voelzke, jurisPK-SGG, 2nd ed., § 88 SGG (as of June 15, 2022), para. 42).
This is not the case here. While the respondent did require the opinion of a third-party authority, the ultimately decisive medical report from the public health department was the supplementary report of November 3, 2025 (actually the main report of September 15, 2025), which established the increased space requirements and obstacles to relocation concerning the husband of applicant no. 1. The further report from February 2026 concerned the family's youngest son and was, firstly, not essential for the decision and, secondly, was only prepared after a considerable delay due to an oversight in the application process, for which the respondent is responsible.
This decision is final and cannot be appealed (§ 172 para. 3 SGG).
